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THE NONDEFAULTING DEBTOR 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
SOONER OR LATER, EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN** 
Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005, one of the most vexing and controversial questions in the con-
sumer bankruptcy arena was whether a debtor who was current on her payments 
to a secured lender could retain the collateral both during and after the bankruptcy 
case by continuing to make the scheduled payments on the loan and otherwise 
avoid any act or omission that might pose a threat to the value or security of the 
collateral. No fewer than nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals addressed this 
question and split as evenly as nine courts possibly could (5-4). The practice is 
known as “ride-through” and the 2005 Act, itself a screed against perceived debtor 
abuse of the bankruptcy law, set out to resolve the matter by eliminating the prac-
tice. However, as was true in connection with many other areas that the legislation 
addressed, Congress made a hash of it. The result has been nearly 15 years of 
continued litigation and even more confusion, unpredictably, and inconsistency 
than pervaded prior to the 2005 Act as courts have struggled to make sense of the 
poorly and illogically drafted amendments. The current situation compromises the 
integrity of the system and exposes debtors and creditors alike to costly uncertainty. 
Recognizing that the law governing individual bankruptcy needs to be tailored to 
have predictable and sensible consequences, this Article, after considering the 
myriad permutations that ride-through cases have taken since 2005, maps out a 
solution that it is contended takes into account of the legitimate interests of credi-
tors as well as debtors. It also measures the consonance of the proposed approach 
for court-protected ride-through within the framework of the larger normative 
goals of the consumer bankruptcy system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 8, 2019, Judge Mark X. Mullin, a United States Bankruptcy Judge 
for the Northern District of Texas, rendered an opinion in a fairly run-of-the-mill 
consumer bankruptcy case that draws attention to an issue that could have sig-
nificant consequences for consumer bankruptcy writ large. The opinion is In re 
Seiffert,1 involving the joint chapter 7 case of Leroy and Rosaleta Seiffert. The 
Seifferts’ bankruptcy petition was filed in August of 2018, and, as of that time, 
they were still indebted to 21st Mortgage Company under the terms of a 2005 
retail installment credit contract for the purchase of their mobile home for 
$43,200, which was secured by a properly perfected purchase money security 
interest in the mobile home.2 As of the date of filing of the petition, and at all 
times thereafter, the Seifferts were current on this indebtedness and otherwise in 
compliance with all other contractual obligations.3 
In accordance with the requirements of § 521(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code,4 the debtors initially filed a statement indicating their intention to retain 
 
1  In re Seiffert, No. 18-43114, 2019 WL 1284299 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019). 
2  Id. at *1. A mobile home is regarded as a “good,” including a fixture, that may be encum-
bered in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
102(a)(53), 9-311(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). If it becomes a fixture, it may 
also be encumbered by a real property mortgage, in which case priority is sorted out under 
U.C.C. § 9-334(e)(4) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). 
3   In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *1–2. 
4  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2). References in this Article to the “Code” or the “Bankruptcy Code” 
are to the current law of bankruptcy, which is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 
U.S.C. § 101 (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 
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the mobile home by entering into a reaffirmation agreement with 21st Mortgage 
on the underlying debt.5 Subsequently, on advice of their lawyer, the Seifferts 
decided not to seek reaffirmation of the debt, and filed an amendment to their 
earlier § 521(a)(2) statement reflecting their decision now to “surrender” the 
property.6 In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that the debtors had no intention 
of actually relinquishing their mobile home. Instead, it is quite likely that their 
plan was to “ride-through” bankruptcy and retain possession of their property,7 
effectively turning the 21st Century Mortgage debt into a nonrecourse obliga-
tion.8 Turns out the Seifferts had a pretty fair bankruptcy lawyer. 
Sniffing out the plan, before the Seiffert’s discharge could be entered, 21st 
Mortgage filed two motions with the bankruptcy court.9 The first sought to com-
pel compliance with the amended statement of intention, i.e., require the Seifferts 
to hand over the mobile home.10 The second motion requested a delay in entry of 
the Seifferts’ discharge until such time as 21st Mortgage had, in fact, taken pos-
session of the mobile home.11 The March 8 opinion was Judge Mullin’s ruling 
on these two motions. 
After careful analysis of the multiple statutory provisions at issue, the court 
denied both motions.12 In so doing, the court provided yet more fuel to the fire 
over whether “ride-through” survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA” or “2005 Act”).13 
Ride-through is the term used for a technique by which debtors who are not in 
default on a secured debt might retain the collateral both during and after bank-
ruptcy, so long as they remain current on their installment payments and commit 
no other acts of default, save for the filing of the bankruptcy case itself.14 
 
Stat. 2549). It was enacted on November 6, 1978, as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, (referred to in text as the “1978 Act”) and governs all cases filed 
on or after October 1, 1979. Id. 
5  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *1. 
6  Id. at *2. 
7  See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
8  21st Century Mortgage’s in personam claim against the Seifferts would be cut off by the 
bankruptcy discharge. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a), 727(a). 
9  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *1–2. 
10  Id. at *3. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at *7. 
13  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 201, 119 Stat. 23, 42 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (referred to in 
text as the “BAPCPA” or the “2005 Act”). Most of the provisions of BAPCPA became effec-
tive for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. See id. § 1501. 
14  Ride-through was predicated on a construction of former § 521(2)(A) that regarded it as 
procedural mechanism for giving notice to secured creditors if the debtor intended to surrender 
the property, reaffirm the debt, or redeem the property, but not as creating a substantive obli-
gation limiting the debtor’s options to those three alternatives, including the option to remain 
current on payments and other obligations, effectively riding through bankruptcy with court 
protection. See In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368, 370–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.), aff’d, Home Owners 
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The answer to the question of whether ride-through still exists has significant 
real-life consequences for the hundreds of thousands of individual debtors who 
file for chapter 7 relief year-in-and-year-out,15 and that impact, in turn, has sig-
nificant implications for the effectiveness of bankruptcy fresh start policy.16 Con-
comitantly, the answer also has profound ramifications for the consumer bank-
ruptcy system generally, a system that has labored without much success to find 
its normative epicenter and strike the optimum balance between debtor protec-
tion and creditor rights. This Article answers the question of whether ride-
through remains alive with a categorical and unequivocal “yes” and “no.” Of 
hopefully greater utility, it also sets out the reasons why the answer is so ambiv-
alent and then proposes a solution that, it is submitted, represents a superior out-
come than that produced by the current state of affairs, both from a micro and a 
macro perspective. That is to say, a more desirable result from the vantage point 
of systemic efficiency as well as debtor rehabilitation. 
 To this end, Part I of this Article provides a high-level overview of the wax-
ing and waning of consumer bankruptcy policy from enactment of the Code to 
present. Next, Part II directs attention specifically on the ride-through contro-
versy that emerged under the Code prior to the enactment of BAPCPA. Part III 
examines the serpentine and, frankly, clumsy manner in which Congress set out 
to resolve the squabbling over ride-through in BAPCPA by seemingly eliminat-
ing it as an option. Part IV then reviews the post-BAPCPA jurisprudence about 
ride-through, including the recent Seiffert decision, revealing how profoundly 
Congress failed if its objective was to bury ride-through for good. Mindful of the 
damage to the system that the current jumbled state of affairs causes, Part V ex-
amines some solutions that have already been proposed in the literature and, con-
cluding that they fall short of the mark, offers an alternative approach for reme-
diating that situation. Finally, Part VI takes a step back and considers the 
implications of that solution from the perspective of the larger goals of the con-
sumer bankruptcy system. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Although historically a creditor’s remedy,17 over the past 120-plus years the 
consumer bankruptcy system has wobbled nervously between the ultimately 
 
Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger, 128 B.R. 142, 145 (E.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d, In re Belanger, 
962 F.2d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 1992); see also infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
15  According to statistics maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States Court, 
in calendar year 2018, 475,575 chapter 7 cases were filed. Table F-2. U.S. Bankruptcy 
Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov 
/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2_1231.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD9M-TKEU]. The 
overwhelming number of which would have been individual consumer cases. See id. 
16  See infra Part VI. 
17  Indeed, voluntary bankruptcy and the concept of “discharge” are relatively recent features 
of the bankruptcy law, both not becoming part of the legal landscape until the Bankruptcy Act 
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irreconcilable goals of relief for overburdened debtors, on the one hand, and the 
realization of creditors’ rights collectively to maximize payment of their claims, 
both contractual and non-consensual, on the other.18 Nonetheless, in an effort to 
provide at least a semblance of equilibrium, the past several decades have wit-
nessed numerous attempts to offer up an overarching theoretical justification for 
the consumer bankruptcy system.19 No single explanation, however, has emerged 
 
of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841) (repealed 1843). See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 n.5 (1985) (recognizing “[t]he 
comparative newness of the fresh-start policy in bankruptcy law”); John C. McCoid, II, Dis-
charge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 
163–65 (1996); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law: A Compar-
ison of the Recent Bankruptcy Acts of Italy and the United States, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 406–
08 (1947). 
18  The bankruptcy law is intended to serve simultaneously as a more efficient and effective 
debt collection device for creditors as well as a mechanism to provide relief to the financially 
distressed debtor. See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. 
PA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1918) (“All bankruptcy law . . . no matter when or where devised and 
enacted, has at least two general objects in view. . . . [It] seeks to protect the creditors, first, 
from one another and, secondly, from their debtor. A third object, the protection of the honest 
debtor from his creditors, by means of the discharge, is sought to be attained in some of the 
systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no means a fundamental feature of the law.”); Thomas 
H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing 
and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155, 162–63 (1989) (examining the distribu-
tional effects of bankruptcy against the traditional value maximization model imagined under 
the ex ante bargain among creditors). 
19  See, e.g., Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (2000) (proposing that “consumer bankruptcy is best justified as 
partial wage insurance”); John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 397, 399 (2000) (contending that the bankruptcy 
discharge is essential to fostering entrepreneurship); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND 
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 91–97 (1997) (emphasizing for-
giveness as the explanation for the bankruptcy discharge); Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh 
Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 
U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 62 (1986) (reviewing the literature up to that time, and noting that in the 
evolution of the fresh start, there has been “a continuing reliance on the notion that relief 
measures served the public welfare by restoring the overburdened debtor to economic produc-
tivity”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1047, 1048 (1987) (suggesting that discharge is necessary to restore the debtor to a participa-
tion in an open credit economy); Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 121, 124 (2004) (“[B]y amending non-bankruptcy collections laws, society could 
largely replicate the fresh start offered by the bankruptcy discharge without any formal pro-
ceeding at all.”); Jackson, supra note 17, at 1403, 1406, 1410, 1414–15, 1417–18 (viewing 
financial failure in the market as stemming from inherent volitional disabilities or cognitive 
biases of individuals, which only a “paternalistic,” “socially mandated” rule—such as a 
nonwaivable discharge—can solve by giving creditors the incentive to police debtors’ credit 
decisions); Dalié Jiménez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 612 (2018) (pro-
posing automatic discharge of debts); Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: 
A Contemporary Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 553, 595 (2010) 
(proposing a “consumer utility” theory of consumer bankruptcy); Charles Jordan Tabb, The 
Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability De-
bate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 90 (1990) (reviewing the literature and concluding that the 
 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
214 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
as predominant, although there is at least no longer any serious opposition to the 
idea that fresh start, an abstraction that has no analog under state collection law,20 
is a necessary component of bankruptcy policy.21 However, that feature of the 
bankruptcy system is in a ceaseless dogfight for hegemony with competing (and 
sometimes even conflicting) policies. Thus, while the ideation of a fresh start for 
individual debtors may be beyond cavil, what the debtor brings with her to this 
fresh start, in terms of property, rights, and entitlements, remains the subject of 
some serious disagreement.22 
On the legislative front, recent decades have seen a significant contraction 
in the circumstances under which chapter 7 relief may be sought, and by whom.23 
As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978  had signaled a major 
 
discharge is the inducement necessary to secure the debtor’s cooperation in locating, collect-
ing, and liquidating assets). 
20  In another context, I described the fresh start as “neither a formal legal status nor a cogniza-
ble right in the usual sense of the terms. Instead, it represents an aspiration of the bankruptcy 
system. It is the condition that is intended to result from application of specific bankruptcy 
rules in particular cases.” Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of 
Agency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515, 2519, 2519 
n.10 (1996). 
21  See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (acknowledging that “a central purpose of 
the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, 
make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’ ” (quoting Loc. 
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934))). The Court was quick to add, however, that this 
opportunity for an unencumbered new beginning was reserved for “ ‘the honest but unfortu-
nate debtor.’ ” Id. at 287 (quoting Loc. Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244); see also Katherine Porter 
& Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 
(2006) (“The principal theory of consumer bankruptcy in America is that it provides a ‘fresh 
start’ to debtors.” quoting Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1059 (1987))); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of 
Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1050 
(2004) (observing that, “Clearly no consensus exists as to the justification for the bankruptcy 
discharge and the debtor’s corresponding fresh start. Theories abound—some are competing, 
some are complementary. Interestingly, there does seem to be agreement approaching consen-
sus among many (but not all) academics that the discharge generally is justified, that current 
law has it about right . . . .”). 
22  This question plays itself out on a variety of fronts beyond loan modification, most notably 
including in connection with exemption policy under § 522 and dischargeability exceptions 
under § 523. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522–523; see Jonathon S. Byington, The Fresh Start Canon, 69 
FLA. L. REV. 115, 116–17 (2017) (examining the tension between the exceptions to discharge 
and fresh start policy); Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bank-
ruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
353, 357, 360–61 (2014) (urging adoption of uniform federal exemptions so as to promote the 
bankruptcy policies of equity, equality, and rehabilitation). 
23  See Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplifi-
cation and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1301–03 (2006) (discussing the credit 
industry’s efforts to nullify the 1978 Act’s “perceived liberalization of personal bankruptcy”); 
see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 
11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 512 (2009) (discussing the dramatic expansion of control exer-
cised by secured creditors in chapter 11 over the preceding decade). 
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shift away from the state law bargain and the state law of creditors remedies.24 
While hardly revolutionary,25 the 1978 Act represented, particularly when 
viewed in light of subsequent amendments, the high-water mark in terms of the 
law’s solicitude for debtors and debtor relief.26 This change in emphasis did not 
go unnoticed by commentators or creditors’ groups, and the 1978 Act rather 
quickly began to take flak for what some perceived as the new bankruptcy law’s 
disdain for the contractual rights of creditors, and, in particular, secured credi-
tors.27 
The perceived consumer-friendly provisions of the 1978 Act were also pil-
loried for causing a sharp spike in bankruptcy filings.28 Critics of the 1978 Act 
 
24  Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Bank-
ruptcy law accomplishes equitable distribution through a distinctive form of collective pro-
ceeding. This is a unique contribution of the Bankruptcy Code that makes bankruptcy different 
from a collection of actions by individual creditors. In a world of individual actions, each 
creditor knows that if he waits too long, the debtor’s assets will have been exhausted by the 
demands of the quicker creditors and he will recover nothing. . . . Federal bankruptcy law 
seeks to avoid this scenario by ‘creat[ing] a whole system under federal control which is de-
signed to bring together and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and embarrassed 
debtors alike.’ ” (quoting MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (alteration in original))). 
25  Professor Howard has pointed out that 
 The history of bankruptcy law shows a steady alteration of the rights of secured creditors, 
undertaken for the purposes of achieving equality of distribution and assuring the debtor a fresh 
start. No revolution occurred with passage of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in 1978; rather, the 
Code continued a progression that began in 1898. 
Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513, 527 
(1992) (footnotes omitted); see also Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 698–702 (1955) (noting that, well before enactment of the 1978 Act, 
American bankruptcy law has moved in the direction of increasing distributions to unsecured 
creditors by decreasing the portions that go to secured and priority claimants). 
26  See Hallinan, supra note 19, at 52 (“In the context of consumer bankruptcies, the Code is 
most notable for its significant expansion of the protection afforded to bankrupt debtors.”); 
David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolu-
tion, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 328 (1999) (pointing out that “[c]ritics of the current 
consumer bankruptcy system argue that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 made filing both 
easier and more attractive”); see also infra note 29. 
27  In the first sentence in his article, The New Bankruptcy Code: The Death of Security Inter-
est?, Professor Peter F. Coogan wryly commented , 
 When I first heard of Grant Gilmore’s The Death of Contract my initial expectation was that 
he would point out the extent to which the exercise by Congress of its power to enact law on the 
subject of bankruptcy already had, and through the then current proposals for a new Bankruptcy 
Act probably would, cut down or change the effect that the parties thought they could provide for 
under prevailing state contract law. 
Peter F. Coogan, The New Bankruptcy Code: The Death of Security Interest?, 14 GA. L. REV. 
153, 153 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
28  See Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A 
Classic Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003) (identifying the 
increased trend of consumers filing for bankruptcy protection as igniting the debate over the 
need to amend the Bankruptcy Code); Jeffrey W. Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy 
Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91, 163 (1985) 
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argued that the liberal provisions of the new law, coupled with the reduced costs 
associated with bankruptcy, made filing easier, less stigmatizing and thus more 
attractive to the average prospective debtor than had been the case under prior 
law.29 Lenders also complained that so-called “can pay” debtors were receiving 
chapter 7 discharges without making any effort or attempt to satisfy creditor 
claims against them.30 
What the disparagers of the 1978 Act overlooked (or, perhaps in some cases 
chose to ignore) was that, in its contemporary form, bankruptcy is intended to be 
a mechanism for nonfulfillment of most state law contract and tort obligations 
without consequence; or at least without being subjected to the liability that 
would normally attend nonfulfillment of such duties.31 A sophisticated, credit-
 
(observing that many of the amendments relating to consumer bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (the “1984 
Act”) reflected “consumer credit industry’s [successful] efforts to persuade Congress that the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 went too far in protecting the interest of debtors at the expense 
of creditors”). Critics also argued that the 1978 had removed the stigma that previously had 
been a restraint on bankruptcy filing and that this, too, ignited a surge in consumer filings. See, 
e.g., Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY 
BANKR. DEVS. J. 481, 485–88 (2006) (associating the rise in bankruptcy filings with the de-
cline in stigma); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 177 BYU L. 
REV. 177, 215–21 (1999) (discussing the decline in shame and stigma associated with a bank-
ruptcy filing). But see Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
213, 233–47 (2006) (contesting the argument that change in stigma accounted in any mean-
ingful way for the higher rate of bankruptcy filings over the past two decades). 
29  For example, according to Vern McKinley, writing for a Cato Institute publication, “[a] 
clear culprit [of] the rise in bankruptcies is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, [that] moved 
[the Code] in a decidedly pro-debtor direction” as part of the consumer movement of that 
period. Vern McKinley, Blame for Ballooning Bankruptcies, CATO INST. (Mar. 9, 1998), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/blame-ballooning-bankruptcies [https://perm 
a.cc/4MN8-ANE3]. But see Moss & Johnson, supra note 26, at 330–31 (offering several ex-
planations debunking the belief that the explosion in consumer filings was attributable to the 
1978 Act, including shifts in the volume and distribution of consumer credit); Todd J. Zywicki, 
An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1467 
(2005) (noting that until the 1978 Act bankruptcy filings used to rise and fall with underlying 
economic conditions, but thereafter escalated dramatically largely uncorrelated with prosper-
ity or downturn). 
30  See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 502–04 (2005) (discussing studies commis-
sioned by the credit industry purporting to demonstrate that a significant percentage of debtors 
that chose chapter 7 could have paid a substantial portion of their debts, and the skeptical 
reaction to them); see also Pamela Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 219, 231 (2018) (pointing out that the allegation that can-pay debtors were taking ad-
vantage of chapter 7 was “contradicted by decades of robust empirical evidence”); Elizabeth 
Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 493 (1997) 
(pointing up that the empirical evidence suggested that, overwhelmingly, bankruptcy was be-
ing used by American families facing grave financial circumstances). 
31  In return for this advantage, debtors subject themselves to a court-supervised procedure 
whereby their assets are marshalled for liquidation in an orderly fashion designed to maximize 
overall value for creditors and then distribute that value equitably, in contrast with the “winner 
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based market economy requires some mechanism to deal with financial catastro-
phe.32 Unless as a society we are prepared to subsidize the costs of financial fail-
ure from the public fisc, achievement of enhanced debtor protection necessarily 
has to come largely at the expense of the debtor’s creditors.33 Moreover, it has 
been argued that allocation of bankruptcy losses to the credit industry has the 
added benefit of incentivizing professional creditors to exercise more caution and 
restraint before engaging in high-risk loans.34 In any case, the 1978 Act’s pursuit 
of a more robust fresh start for debtors, greater creditor equality, and enhanced 
prospects for debtor survival through reorganization, all pressed for less defer-
ence to state law distributional rules and creditor remedies than theretofore had 
been the case.35 
Consistent with Newton’s third law of motion,36 ever since promulgation of 
the 1978 Act the focus of most so-called bankruptcy reform legislation has been 
to halt, and then begin to reverse, the swing of the pendulum in favor of debtor 
relief and ratable distribution among creditors.37 The culmination of this trend 
 
take all” mode of state collection law and remedies. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF 
BANKRUPTCY 4–6 (4th ed. 2016) (comparing state law collection remedies and bankruptcy); 
see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
32  The notion is best captured in former astronaut and former CEO of the bankrupt Eastern 
Airlines Frank Borman’s quip that, “Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity with-
out hell.” FORBESQUOTES, https://www.forbes.com/quotes/3057 [https://perma.cc/2URT-
KTTV]. 
33  See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
336, 361 (1993) (discussing as one of the normative functions of the bankruptcy law a desire 
to constrain externalization of losses to parties not dealing with the debtor firm). Of course, 
the creditor response is that the impact of internalization of cost is higher costs of credit ex 
ante. See Anthony Sexton, Indubitably Uncertain: Philadelphia Newspapers and the Role of 
Valuation Uncertainty in Attempted Cramdown of All-Equity Plans, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. 
J. 55, 68 (2011). The extent to which that is true is the subject of some debate. See infra notes 
274–75. 
34  See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 235–37 (1986) 
(postulating that the discharge is necessary to protect debtors as a class from extending them-
selves financially beyond any realistic ability to repay by creating an incentive for creditors to 
make the judgment—a judgment he contends creditors are better equipped to make—of 
whether any particular credit transaction is one that the debtor is suited financially to under-
take). 
35  E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781–88 (1987). 
36  “For every action, there is an equal and opposite [reaction].” See Glenn Rsch. Ctr., Newton’s 
Laws of Motion, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-
12/airplane/newton.html [https://perma.cc/UPH5-AEZC]. 
37  The process was likely aided by the fact that the one major attempt to create a unified theory 
of bankruptcy, grounded in the law and economics tradition, emphasized a contractual ap-
proach to the subject. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 8–20 (setting forth basic principles of 
bankruptcy law and presenting bankruptcy as a system of contracts between creditors); Doug-
las G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 815, 831–33 (1987) (advocating for a view of bankruptcy that would preserve in 
bankruptcy proceedings the rights and relations creditors have outside of bankruptcy law). 
Jackson’s creditors’ bargain theory posits that bankruptcy law should try to emulate the bar-
gain that creditors would have made themselves had circumstances permitted. This model was 
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was BAPCPA, illustrating the related adage that when the pendulum does swing 
back, rarely does it stop at dead center. BAPCPA was widely (and not without 
cause) criticized as having been bought and paid for by the consumer credit in-
dustry.38 While this may be a bit of an overstatement, and despite the “consumer 
protection” language in its title, no one would honestly claim that BAPCPA was 
anything other than a pro-creditors’ bill.39 Moreover, by almost every account, it 
was “confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory” and “intro-
duce[d] new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different from, 
 
appealing to the credit industry. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. It is worth 
noting that 2019 finally saw the enactment of sensible, nonpartisan bankruptcy legislation. 
E.g., Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-51, 133 Stat. 1075; Honoring Veter-
ans in Extreme Need Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-52, 133 Stat. 1076; Small Business Reor-
ganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079. This offers some hope that future 
bankruptcy reform legislation, including the proposal made in this treatment, might proceed 
in a more balanced and less special-interest oriented fashion. 
38  See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2216 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin); 
151 CONG. REC. H2084 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott); see also 
Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 189, 193 n.6, 195–202 (1999) (suggesting that the legislation that ultimately was enacted 
as BAPCPA was reputed to originally have been written by one law firm retained by the credit 
industry, Morrison & Foerster, and noting that experts’ efforts to fix its many flaws were 
thereafter largely resisted by credit industry for fear it might invite closer scrutiny and a re-
working of the amendments most dear to the industry). In fairness, if one looks hard enough, 
one does find some scraps of consumer protection, such as the additional protection for retire-
ment assets in §§ 522(b)(3)(C) and 541(b)(7), greater controls over reaffirmations in § 524(k), 
expansion of the discharge injunction in § 524(i) to include the proper crediting of payments, 
and elevated protection in several areas for domestic support obligations, such as elevating the 
priority of such claims in §§ 507(a)(1)(A) and (B). Of course, in the last example the parties 
who have to make good on those domestic obligations are “consumers,” too, and they likely 
do not regard most of these provisions as providing them with greater relief. Also, at least one 
skeptic (or realist) has wondered aloud how much of the motivation had to do with grabbing 
an opportunity for “positive political public relations.” See TABB, supra note 31, at 677. 
39  For an overview of credit industry spending on studies, lobbying, and campaign contribu-
tions from 1998 until shortly before passage of BAPCPA, see Landry, supra note 28, at 516–
22; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231–32 (2010) 
(noting that Congress enacted BAPCPA in order “to correct perceived abuses of the bank-
ruptcy system”); In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 266 n.4 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (noting, in response 
to a statement in a House Report (H.R. Rep. No. 31, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (2005), re-
printed in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 88–89) to the effect that BAPCPA’s purpose was to ensure 
that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors, that “[t]his statement, in the context of 
BAPCPA’s creditor-friendly language throughout, aptly illustrates the tone and substance of 
BAPCPA—it is to remedy a perceived imbalance in the Code favoring debtors. Regardless of 
whether that perception was accurate or not, Congress clearly adjusted the perceived imbal-
ance in favor of creditors.”). For a more nuanced view of BAPCPA that argues the pure in-
dustry capture explanation is incomplete, see generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating 
Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861 (2006); cf. Jean 
Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
349, 365 (2008) (pointing out that the consumer protection goals in BAPCPA reflect “a com-
bination of ignorance about the facts and wishful thinking about likely effects of the measures 
adopted”). 
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established terms that are well understood.”40 A model of legislative drafting it 
was not.41 
II.  RIDE-THROUGH IN THE PRE-BAPCPA ERA 
Section 521(2) was not part of the Bankruptcy Code as originally enacted. 
Rather, it was added to the Code by § 305 of the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.42 Intended as a response to complaints from 
 
40  In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (describing the process of deci-
phering BAPCPA as “like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube that arrived with a manufacturer’s 
defect”); see Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bank-
ruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 97 (2007) (“The problems 
with the 2005 Act are breathtaking. There are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging para-
graphs, and inconsistencies.” (footnotes omitted)); Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Adopts the 
Forward-Looking Approach to Projected Disposable Income in Chapter 13, 30 BANKR. L. 
LETTER 2, Aug. 2010, Westlaw, 30 No. 8 BLL 2 (“BAPCPA is a poorly drafted statute. What’s 
more, Congress knew that it was a poorly drafted statute and was warned repeatedly about all 
of the difficulties that it would pose for the courts . . . . Congress just did not care, though, and 
enacted BAPCPA without attempting to fix even the most glaring drafting gaffes.”); Keith M. 
Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 
2005, at 1, 70 (“The list of drafting errors and incomprehensible provisions grows every day 
as bankruptcy professionals digest BAPCPA. Especially the consumer parts, this legislation 
was not written or vetted by the practitioners and scholars usually involved in bankruptcy 
legislative efforts.”); Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Rights in Bank-
ruptcy Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2014) (describing BAPCPA as “clumsily 
drafted, unnecessarily prolix, internally inconsistent, and annealed in a cauldron of special 
interest pressures” (footnotes omitted)); see also John Rao, Testing the Limits of Statutory 
Construction Doctrines: Deconstructing the 2005 Bankruptcy Act, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1427, 
1427 (2006) (“Most bankruptcy practitioners, scholars, and courts readily agree on one thing: 
the 2005 Bankruptcy Act . . . is poorly drafted.”); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense 
Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191–92 (2005) (noting that prior 
to BAPCPA the bankruptcy experts drafted previous amendments to title 11, and also that the 
BAPCPA drafters refused to make technical corrections to the statute). 
41  Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(wryly observing that “BAPCPA is hardly the very model of a well-drafted statute”). Judge—
now Professor—Markell made the same point by citing Lewis Carroll. In re Trejos, 352 B.R. 
249, 253–54 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (“Making practical sense . . . of much of BAPCPA re-
quires bankruptcy judges to adopt the approach of the White Queen, and believe in ‘as many 
as six impossible things before breakfast.’ ” (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES 
IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 157 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981) (1865))). 
42  See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 
305, 98 Stat. 333, 352–53. The bill was sponsored by consumer creditor organizations, resisted 
by debtor-oriented groups, and debated extensively in the Congress. In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682, 
685–86 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994). The legislative pulling and hauling over the section is de-
scribed in considerable detail in the case of In re Weir, in which the court said of former 
§ 521(2) 
 It is evident that section 521(2) bears scars from crippling wounds suffered in hard-fought 
battles. Its text is so enigmatic, particularly in light of the rejected version, that the most that can 
be said in its defense is that the Congress settled upon a calculated ambiguity to resolve an intrac-
table difference of opinion. 
In re Weir, 173 B.R. at 685. 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
220 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
secured creditors over the potentially prejudicial effects resulting from unreason-
able delay by debtors in exercising their rights with respect to collateral,43 
§ 521(a)(2)(A) required that, in the case of consumer debts secured by property 
of the estate, an individual debtor must provide prompt notification44 of her in-
tentions “with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if appli-
cable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends 
to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by 
such property.”45 Subparagraph (B) then called for the debtor to perform in ac-
cordance with that stated intention no later than forty-five days following the 
filing of the notice of intent under subparagraph (A).46 
A question quickly arose over whether this new provision was properly read 
as limiting the debtor’s options to one of the three specified alternatives: (i) sur-
render, (ii) retention with redemption of the collateral (if available47), or 
 
43  At the same time, creditors contended that they could not obtain such information on their 
own initiative without running the risk of engaging in prohibited or unauthorized communica-
tions, particularly with pro se debtors. This uncertainty forced creditors to either incur the 
expense of proceeding with what might later turn out to have been an unnecessary action for 
relief from the stay or stand fast and risk a significant decline in the value of the collateral. In 
re Gregory, 572. B.R. 220, 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (explaining creditor frustration in 
having to file motions for stay relief only to learn that the debtor intended to redeem or reaffirm 
the debt); In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59, 69–72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 
Gov’t Emps. Credit Union v. Castillo, 213 B.R. 316 (W.D. Tex. 1997); In re Belanger, 118 
B.R. 368, 371–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d, Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. 
Belanger (In re Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am.), 128 B.R. 142 (E.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d, 
Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 
1992). For an alternative (or at least additional) explanation, see In re Lair, 235 B.R. 1, 35 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) (“The 1984 Consumer Finance Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
were intended, inter alia, to protect creditors from the risks of quickly depreciating assets and 
to keep credit costs from escalating because of the too-ready availability of discharge.”). 
44  The Statement of Intention (Official Form No. 8) must be filed at the earlier of thirty days 
after the petition is filed or the date of the first meeting of creditors. See infra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
45  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 305, 
98 Stat. 333, 352 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A)). 
46  Id. sec. 305, 98 Stat. at 352–53 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B)). 
47  Under § 722, redemption is only an option with respect to “tangible personal property in-
tended primarily for personal, family, or household use . . .  [and] securing a dischargeable 
consumer debt,” and redemption requires full payment of the allowed amount of the lender’s 
secured claim as of the time of redemption. See 11 U.S.C. § 722. Section 327 of BAPCPA put 
this option even further out of reach of the ordinary debtor by amending § 506(a)(2) to require 
that the value of personal property securing a claim in the case of an individual in chapter 7 
will always be based on the cost to the debtor of replacing the property without deduction for 
costs of sale or marketing. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 327, 119 Stat. 23, 99–100. This effectively overruled the holding 
of the Supreme Court in Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Rash, which had used retail value as the start-
ing point, but then suggested a deduction for items the debtor does not receive when he retains 
the collateral, such as “warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning.” 520 U.S. 953, 965 
n.6 (1997); see In re Tripplett, 256 B.R. 594, 597–98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (reflecting the 
pre-BAPCPA majority interpretation that the value of collateral for purposes of redemption 
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(iii) retention with reaffirmation of the debt.48 As for the answer to this question, 
there was a decided and disturbing lack of consensus. 
Five circuit courts of appeal, the Second,49 Third,50 Fourth51 Ninth,52 and 
Tenth,53 adopted the view that the designated alternatives in former § 521(2) 
were neither exclusive nor mandatory.54 These courts came to the conclusion that 
a debtor who was otherwise current on a secured consumer debt had what came 
to be known as a “fourth option,” which was to retain the collateral, continue 
making timely payment of regularly scheduled obligations, and otherwise per-
form in accordance with the terms of the applicable loan documentation.55 The 
creditor’s right of repossession and foreclosure would then only be triggered, if 
at all, upon the occurrence of a postbankruptcy event of default. 
By and large, these decisions rested their interpretation on two separate pro-
visions in § 521(2). First (and probably foremost), they relied on the use of the 
 
should be measured by what the creditor would receive upon repossession). With respect to 
personal property acquired for consumer purposes, the second sentence of § 506(a)(2) now 
directs that replacement value means the amount a retail merchant would charge for property 
of comparable age and condition. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). The pre-BAPCPA majority in-
terpretation that the value of collateral for purposes of redemption should be measured by what 
the creditor would receive upon repossession. See In re Tripplett, 256 B.R. at 597–98. 
48  The debtor was also required to specify, as is still true, if the property was claimed as ex-
empt. FED. R. BANKR. PRO. 4003. This was (and remains) necessary for the trustee to be able 
to evaluate the estate’s interest in circumstances where there is equity over and above the sum 
of nonavoidable liens against the property. In such a case, unless the property is exempt, the 
debtor’s decision to retain the property is without is prejudice to the trustee’s rights in the 
property on behalf of the estate. See former 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C); see also infra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
49  Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 
1997), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. The court concluded that former § 521(2) was ambig-
uous on the question of whether Congress intended the stated options to be exclusive, and, 
thus, resolved the issue by reference to the legislative history and policy considerations. Id. 
50  Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union U.S. Tr. (In re Price), 370 F.3d 362, 372 (3d 
Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
51  Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th 
Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
52  McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998), 
superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
53  Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989), superseded by 
statute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23. 
54  Id. at 1546 (“We are in accord with the district and bankruptcy courts that the mere filing 
of the petition has not put [the lender] in any more jeopardy than that which existed prior to 
the filing of the petition.”). The court did not affirmatively rule on the enforceability of the 
ipso facto clause because it believed it was not necessary to do so in order to allow the debtor 
to retain the vehicle, but alluded that it might well be problematic. Id. at n.5 (citing Riggs Nat’l 
Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 984–85 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
55  See, e.g., In re Price, 370 F.3d at 375. 
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phrase “if applicable” in subparagraph (A) as imposing an obligation on a debtor 
to declare his intention to redeem or reaffirm only if the debtor in fact intended 
to exercise one of those alternatives.56 In effect, they regarded inclusion of this 
language in former § 521(2)(A) as signaling that there is an obligation to disclose 
an intent to employ one of the statutory options when such an intent exists, but 
no duty to choose exclusively from among those options as a condition to retain-
ing the collateral.57 Second, many of the courts that construed the options in 
§ 521(2) as nonexclusive emphasized former subparagraph (C), which provided 
that “nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) . . . shall alter the debtor’s or the trus-
tee’s rights with regard to such property under this title.”58 These courts quite 
reasonably pointed out that constraining the debtor to redemption, reaffirmation, 
or surrender did “alter” the debtor’s rights with respect to the property in direct 
contravention of the interdiction in subparagraph (C).59 Bolstering their statutory 
construction rationales, some courts also grounded their determination of the ex-
istence of a fourth option on core bankruptcy policy, most notably the fresh start 
policy.60 
In a near Mexican standoff, four other circuit courts of appeals came to just 
the opposite conclusion, construing former § 521(2) as requiring the debtor to 
 
56  E.g., In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673 (“Our interpretation of that language is that the only 
mandatory act is the filing of the statement of intention, which the debtor ‘shall’ file. Then, ‘if 
applicable,’—that is, if the debtor plans to choose any of the three options listed later in the 
statute . . .—the debtor must so specify in the statement of intention.”). In a journal article, 
Bankruptcy Judge Pappas argued that reading the statutory language this way created a mean-
ing that was not supported by plain English, and that the “if applicable” phrase should be read 
to refer to the options listed in the statute, as opposed to other non-specified choices. Jim D. 
Pappas, Section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Creditor’s Predicament in Getting Paid 
as Agreed, 99 COM. L.J. 45, 61–62 (1994). Several courts of appeal agreed with Judge Pappas. 
See cases cited infra note 61 and accompanying text. In light of the centrality of this language 
to the disagreement in the case law over ride-through, remarkably, BAPCPA did not change 
the language in any way. See infra text accompanying note 89. 
57  See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348 
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the debtor must choose one of the referenced options if, and only 
if, one of them is applicable (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 521.09A, at 521–49 (Law-
rence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1991))). 
58  Id. at 346–47 (criticizing the authorities that regarded the three options as exclusive for 
ignoring or failing to give effect to § 521(2)(C) and legislative history that disclosed Congress 
rejected a proposal to lift the automatic stay if the debtor did not timely redeem or reaffirm). 
59  For example, in In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996), the court observed, 
“[a]mazingly, courts restricting the debtor to redemption or reaffirmation refer not at all to 
subparagraph (C). Yet its meaning is plain, especially in light of its location in a statute whose 
other paragraphs all relate to procedure and not substance.” 
60  See, e.g., In re Price, 370 F.3d at 378 (noting that this reasoning conforms most closely 
with the bankruptcy fresh start principle); Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In 
re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1997) (admitting that the plain language of the 
statute could support both interpretations and deciding in favor of a fourth option based on the 
fundamental premise of a fresh start for debtors overburdened with debt), superseded by stat-
ute, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23. 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
Fall 2020] A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 223 
choose among, and only among, the three options stated in the statute.61 The ef-
fect, of course, was to mandate redemption or reaffirmation as a necessary con-
dition to the debtor’s ability to retain possession of the collateral.62 These courts 
emphasized that allowing an additional alternative under which a debtor could 
retain the property subject only to performance of the duties specified in the se-
curity agreement would give the debtor not just a fresh start, but a “head start.”63 
In terms of the “if applicable” language of former § 521(2)(A), the courts reject-
ing the fourth option subscribed to the view that this language related only to the 
choices between surrender and retaining, and not to permitting alternatives be-
yond the three specified options.64 Put another way, these courts construed the 
language as requiring the debtor to state whether she planned to redeem or reaf-
firm the debt if the debtor had indicated an intention to retain as opposed to sur-
render the property. They also justified this interpretation on the basis that in 
these circumstances the debtor, having been relieved from personal liability for 
the debt by the discharge, would have no incentive to preserve and maintain the 
collateral if ride-through were permitted, thus placing the creditor’s interest 
 
61  Bank of Bos. v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843, 849 (1st Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Sun Fin. 
Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In 
re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 
1990). Lower courts in the Eighth Circuit were split on the issue. Compare In re Canady-
Houston, 281 B.R. 286, 287–88 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002) (recognizing ride-through), with In 
re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (declining to recognize ride-through). 
See Sanabria v. Am. Nat’l Bank (In re Sanabria), 317 B.R. 59, 60–61 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004) 
(“The issue has not been addressed in the Eight [sic] Circuit at an appellate level and the trial 
courts within this circuit are split. While a definitive ruling on that issue might be helpful in 
this circuit, the issue is not properly before this Court.” (footnotes omitted)); Philip R. Prin-
cipe, Did BAPCPA Eliminate the Fourth Option for Individual Debtors Secured Personal 
Property?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. n.5 (Oct. 2005), https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/legislative-
update-did-bapcpa-eliminate-the-fourth-option-for-individual-debtors-secured [https://perma. 
cc/F3AB-CD2J] (describing the position of courts in the Eighth Circuit on ride-through0. The 
other circuit without a decision from its court of appeals was the Sixth Circuit. However, most 
of the lower courts in the circuit concluded that redemption and reaffirmation constituted the 
exclusive mechanisms for a debtor to retain possession of secured collateral based on another 
Sixth Circuit decision deciding prior enactment of former § 521(2). Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting installment redemp-
tion); see, e.g., In re Chubb, 351 B.R. 478, 481–83 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
62  In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516 (“Allowing retention of the property without reaffirmation or 
redemption would be tantamount to forcing the creditor into a de facto reaffirmation agreement 
with no recourse against the debtor.” (quoting Bank S. v. Horne (In re Horne), 132 B.R. 661, 
663–64 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991))); see also id. at 1515 (citing several cases supporting the 
proposition that debtors are limited to the three statutory options). 
63  See In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516 (“[I]t is clear when the options of redemption and reaffir-
mation would not be applicable. This language does not apply to a debtor’s surrender of the 
property; it therefore must apply to a debtor’s retention of property. If a debtor retains secured 
property, then the options of redemption and reaffirmation are applicable, and the debtor is 
required to redeem or reaffirm.”). 
64  Id.; see also Pappas, supra note 56, at 61–62 (observing that, “while courts liked to argue 
the point, the language of the statute appears clearly mandatory in its terms” in requiring the 
debtor to make an election, and “[i]t would be curious for Congress to order a debtor to per-
form, but not to restrict the possible options available to the debtor.”). 
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unfairly in jeopardy.65 The courts rejecting ride-through further ruled that the 
language in former § 521(2)(C) did not alter the debtor’s responsibility to elect 
only from among the three stated options, pointing out that subdivision (C) 
“merely [functioned] to make supreme over the directives of § 521(2)(A) and (B) 
rights conferred upon the trustee and debtor elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code,” 
not to displace those directives in the first instance.66 
III.  THE 2005 ACT 
A.  The Road to BAPCPA 
In 1994, Congress created a blue-ribbon commission, the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission (the “Commission”), to study and recommend 
changes to the Code.67 In its 1997 Report, the Commission proposed that ride-
through not be permitted,68 but that recommendation cannot be fully understood 
except in the context of the Commission’s companion recommendations regard-
ing reaffirmation. 
The Commission originally resolved to prohibit reaffirmation entirely.69 
However, after hearing from creditor groups and deliberating further on the im-
plications of reaffirmation from the perspective of the goals of equality of distri-
bution,70 encouraging filings under chapter 13,71 and protecting debtors from 
abusive reaffirmation practices,72 the Commission changed course and recom-
mended that reaffirmations only be eliminated as to unsecured debt.73 Then, to 
 
65  See In re Edwards 901 F.2d at 1386 (“When a debtor is relieved of personal liability on 
loans secured by collateral, the debtor has little or no incentive to insure or maintain the prop-
erty in which a creditor retains a security interest. The value of the collateral may fall below 
the level of the loan, leaving the creditor undersecured and driving up future costs of credit.”). 
This point is a staple in the anti-ride-through playbook. See infra Section V.A.1. The point 
was made most forcefully by Judge Drake in In re Horne, 132 B.R. at 664 (opining that “debt-
ors would have no incentive to keep the property in good condition or to continue making 
payments if the value of the collateral declined below the amount of the debt or was destroyed. 
Such an arrangement is contrary to the language of the Code.” (citation omitted)). 
66  See In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 848; see also Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow 
(In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 59 (2d Cir. 1997) (Shadur, J., dissenting) (explaining that lim-
iting a chapter 7 debtor to the three options in former “[§] 521(2)(A) is perfectly consistent 
with the qualifying language of [former §] 521(2)(C)”). 
67  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 603, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147. 
68  1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 4 (1997). 
69  Id. at 148. The thinking was that any restructuring of long-term debts should occur under 
chapter 13. Clearly, the Commission’s views were influenced by evidence of coercive creditor 
practices, noting that reaffirmations were almost banned by Congress in 1978. Id. at 146. 
70  Id. at 158–59. 
71  Id. at 159–60. 
72  Id. at 156. 
73  Id. at 160 (stating that “current reaffirmation practices are inconsistent with promoting re-
payment in Chapter 13, equal treatment of creditors, and financial rehabilitation of debtors”). 
The Commission also admonished debtors’ attorneys to “narrowly and strictly” construe the 
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be consistent with that position, the Commission also recommended that reaffir-
mations of secured debt be limited to the value of the underlying collateral.74 In 
this way, the Commission reasoned that secured creditors would either receive 
the property itself upon surrender or the equivalent cash value of that property 
over time, which is generally the way in which “secured claims” are treated in 
the bankruptcy process generally.75 
“When the Commission initially recommended a complete ban on reaffir-
mations, it also recommended that the Code explicitly recognize ride-through.”76 
The thinking was that a ban on reaffirmations, coupled with ride-through, would 
enable a debtor to retain property while discharging personal liability, provided 
that the debtor was current on the obligation when she filed for bankruptcy (or 
the creditor was inclined to waive the default). After the Commission shifted 
gears and decided to support reaffirmation rights for the secured portion only 
(i.e., the value of the collateral) of secured debts, “it then became logical to re-
verse its position on ride-through.”77 
Specifically, the Commission’s concern over debtors reaffirming debt in ex-
cess of the value of the collateral and/or beyond their ability to pay in order to 
avoid losing essential property were largely addressed by the ban on unsecured 
debt reaffirmation.78 At the same time, creditors with debts secured by personal 
property would retain their in rem rights against the collateral and, responding to 
one of the principal creditor objections to ride-through,79 would be protected 
against depreciation of that collateral faster than amortization of the loan by the 
debtor’s continued personal liability to the extent of the value of the collateral. 
In the case of partially secured creditors, the unsecured portion of the debt would 
be treated like all other unsecured debts and discharged. Of course, in return for 
this protection creditors would sacrifice the possibility that ride-through might 
have produced a greater overall return,80 but, on balance, the compromise 
seemed to be a fair and equitable one. After all, creditors who complained bitterly 
about ride-through to begin with hardly had standing to object to the proposal on 
the basis it deprived them of the possibility of a full recovery on a less than fully-
secured loan. 
 
“best interest of the debtor” requirement as a critical component of zealous representation. Id. 
at 161. 
74  Id. at 160. 
75  Id. Under § 506(a) a creditor is only deemed to have a secured claim to the extent of the 
value of its collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The excess of the obligation over and above that 
value is treated as an unsecured claim. Id. at § 506(b). Thus, by limiting the reaffirmation of 
debt to the value of the property securing the debt, these creditors would receive the full value 
of their secured claims. 
76  NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 68, at 166. 
77  Id. at 167. 
78  Id. at 160. 
79  See supra note 65. 
80  NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 68, at 167. 
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These quite sensible recommendations, along with most of the Commis-
sion’s other recommendations, were essentially ignored, as the lobby for con-
sumer creditor organizations anticipated and attempted to ambush the majority 
report by pressing furiously for the introduction of bipartisan legislation that ad-
vanced the views of the four dissenting members of the Commission.81 They 
were ultimately successful. That legislative proposal, and its successors, domi-
nated the conversation over the next several years, and eventually resulted in the 
enactment of the 2005 Act.82 
B. Enter BAPCPA 
The relatively sparse legislative history accompanying BAPCPA did not 
speak directly to the ride-through question.83 Nevertheless, given the overall 
tenor of the statute,84 it is fanciful to imagine that it was not Congress’s desire 
(or, more accurately, the desire of the financial services industry that drove the 
BAPCPA bus) to eliminate ride-through without exception.85 The question is 
 
81  Id. at 1043, et seq. (Individual Commissioners’ views); see, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 39, 
at 1865 (noting that before the NBRC’s Report was even filed, the credit lobby found support-
ers in the 105th Congress to sponsor legislation adopting the views of the dissenting Commis-
sioners); Landry, supra note 28, at 517–18 (2003) (explaining that credit industry lobbyists 
turned to Congress after failing to induce National Bankruptcy Review Commission to pro-
duce a report aligned with their interests). 
82  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). BAPCPA became fully 
effective for cases filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005. See Jensen, supra note 30, at 512–15 (tracing 
the progression of the bills, beginning with the 1997 bill that preempted the Commission’s 
Report, that eventually resulted in the passage of BAPCPA). 
83  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3 (2005) (no corresponding Senate report); see Jean Braucher, 
Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collat-
eral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 460–61 n.13 (2005); Daim-
lerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., Inc. v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the dearth of legislative history for many provisions of BAPCPA). 
84  See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text; see also Sean C. Currie, The Multiple Pur-
poses of Bankruptcy: Restoring Bankruptcy’s Social Insurance Function After BAPCPA, 7 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 241, 251 (2009) (suggesting that contrary to the stated goals of the 
proponents of BAPCPA, “the negative impact of BAPCPA illustrates a starkly different goal, 
which is not to prevent abuse, but instead to prevent or deter filing for bankruptcy altogether”). 
85  See, e.g., Currie, supra note 84, at 266–67 (contending that the BAPCPA amendments were 
to respond to creditor dissatisfaction with ride-through and assure debtors could not retain 
secured property without reaffirming the entire debt); Charles J. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues 
in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 9, 9 (“The enactment of 
BAPCPA marked the successful culmination of over two score years of intense, fervent, and 
well-funded lobbying by the consumer credit industry.”); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform 
and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (“[BAPCPA] radi-
cally altered the policies underlying consumer bankruptcy in this country, marking a signifi-
cant shift in favor of creditors.”); William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender 
Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 150–56 (describing changes particularly 
favorable to auto lenders); see also supra note 39. But see Christopher M. Hogan, Note, Will 
the Ride-Through Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 920 (2008) (accepting as a given that 
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whether Congress accomplished what it set out to do, the answer to which is, I 
believe, certainly not, or at least not entirely. In order to explain that assertion, it 
is necessary to begin by reviewing the myriad amendments made by BAPCPA 
bearing on the ride-through puzzle. 
Instead of taking a clean and direct route to eliminating the ride-through, 
such as adding a new ground for objecting to the dischargeability of a particular 
debt,86 in the inelegant fashion so characteristic of BAPCPA generally,87 Con-
gress adopted or amended a dizzying array of Code provisions in a tumble. First, 
although re-codified as § 521(a)(2)(A), Congress largely left intact the threshold 
requirement of former § 521(2)(A) that an individual chapter 7 debtor must file 
a statement of intention to either surrender or retain property of the estate that 
serves as security for a debt,88 including the “if applicable” language that proved 
so nettlesome under the prior version of the statue.89 The only change to former 
§ 521(2)(B) (now denominated as § 521(a)(2)(B)) was to shorten the time for the 
debtor to perform in accordance with her stated intention from forty-five to thirty 
days.90 Notably, Congress also modified the language of former § 521(2)(C) (re-
codified by BAPCPA as § 521(a)(2)(C))91 by adding to the end of the sentence 
reading that “nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter 
the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such property” the provision 
“except as provided in section 362(h).” A new provision, § 362(h)(1), calls for 
the termination of the automatic stay with respect to personal property serving as 
collateral for a claim, and ejection of such property from the estate, without the 
necessity of court order in the event of an individual debtor’s failure to file a 
statement of intention in accordance with § 521(a)(2)(A), or failure to perform 
in accordance with that statement as required by § 521(a)(2)(B).92 Subsection 
362(h)(2) allows the trustee an opportunity to avoid having the property removed 
from the estate under subsection (h)(1) upon a showing that the personal property 
 
BAPCPA was intended to protect rather than injure the lower and middle classes by curbing 
high-income abusers). 
86  Adding failure to comply with the debtor’s duties as specified in § 521(a)(2) as one of the 
exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) would have done the trick. Alternatively, Congress could 
have addressed the ambiguity of the “if applicable” language in § 521(a)(2)(A) by making 
clear it referred only to the choice between redemption and reaffirmation if the debtor elected 
not to surrender the collateral. See supra note 56. 
87  See supra notes 38–40. 
88  The only change was to drop the word “consumer” before the word “debtor,” which was of 
minimal impact. 
89  See supra text accompanying notes 56 & 64. 
90  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
tit. 3, sec. 305, § 521(a)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 23, 79–80. 
91  Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, sec. 2(a)(16)(A)(iii), 
124 Stat. 3557, 3559 (striking the “designator” (C) from § 521(a)(2), and added the words 
“except that” to the beginning of the phrase relating to not altering the rights of the debtor or 
the trustee). 
92  Note that this section does not itself impose any penalty or sanction for noncompliance with 
§ 521(a) other than to terminate the stay. The actions that the creditor may then take with 
respect to the collateral is determined by applicable (usually state) nonbankruptcy law. 
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has consequential value or benefit to the estate, and that the creditor’s interest is 
adequately protected. If such a showing is made, then the debtor is required to 
deliver the property to the trustee. If not, the consequences spelled out in subsec-
tion (h)(1) ensue at the conclusion of the hearing on the trustee’s motion. 
Notably, subdivision (1)(A) of § 362(h) does not state that the debtor must 
choose one of the three options delineated in § 521(a)(2)(A).93 It simply particu-
larizes the consequences of the failure to comply with the statutory directive. 
Moreover, subdivision (B) of § 362(h)(a)(1) contains a proviso carving out an 
exception to the lifting of the stay where the debtor proposes reaffirmation “on 
the original contract terms and the creditor refuses.”94 In short, § 362(h) does not 
definitely declare or affirm, and arguably cannot fairly be read to imply, that ride-
through is eliminated any more than it can be read to indicate that the option still 
exists. Rather, it seems to represent yet another missed opportunity by BAPCPA 
to make legislative intent on the question, for better or worse, manifold. 
Next, Congress added a new subdivision (6) to § 521(a) stipulating that in a 
consumer chapter 7 case the debtor may not retain possession of personal prop-
erty “as to which a creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price secured 
in whole or in part by an interest in such personal property,” unless, within forty-
five days after the first meeting of creditors, the debtor either enters into an agree-
ment to redeem such property or reaffirms the debt. 95 Failure to act within the 
 
93  It provides only that the failure to file the required statement of intention “or to indicate in 
such statement that the debtor will either surrender such personal property or retain it.” 11 
U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(A). The leading bankruptcy treatise suggests that the use of the term “or” 
in the above formulation is an indication that Congress left open options beyond those stated. 
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.11 (16th ed. 2020), LexisNexis (database updated Sept. 
2020) (“Moreover, in light of the apparent purpose of section 362(h) to encourage debtor com-
pliance with section 521, there is no reason to conclude that Congress intended to limit the 
options under section 521(a)(2) with the enactment of section 362(h), and the two subsections 
should be read together in a manner that gives effect to both.”). 
94  This exception where ride-through seems explicitly authorized, is itself unusual in that it 
conflicts with the creditor equality principle so central to the bankruptcy regime, at least where 
the lender is undersecured. That is, by effectively forcing the debtor, as the only way to avoid 
lifting of the stay, to reaffirm a debt in excess of the value of the collateral, § 362(h) awards 
the unsecured portion of the lender’s claim priority over other unsecured creditors. There is a 
question of whether a debtor who offered to reaffirm on the original contract term is also 
protected by the discharge injunction after the discharge is entered and the case is closed. See 
Braucher, supra note 83, at 478. For discussion of application of this exception where the 
debtor seeks an accommodation beyond the original contract terms, such as additional postpe-
tition credit, see also infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
95  There is some disagreement in the case law about meaning of language in § 521(a)(6) re-
ferring to “an allowed claim for the purchase price” of the collateral. Compare In re Donald, 
343 B.R. 524, 536–37 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (relying on the BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 
6th ed. 1990), definition of the term “purchase price” to conclude that the plain meaning of 
the term “claim for the purchase price” means claim for the full purchase price), with In re 
Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 706–07 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (finding that the legislative history 
indicates an intention that § 521(a)(6) should encompass purchase money security interests 
and concluding that “creditors with purchase money security interests in personal 
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forty-five-day period does not implicate § 362(h), but, in a floating paragraph 
oddly following § 521(a)(7), the consequences of failing to comply with 
§ 521(a)(6) are spelled out.96 In particular, these include the automatic removal 
of the property from the estate and immediate lifting of the stay so as to permit 
the creditor to take whatever action may be appropriate under applicable non-
bankruptcy law.97 The relationship between §§ 521(a)(2) and 521(a)(6) is a bit 
of a mystery.98 Clearly, in many cases both provisions will be in play, and it’s 
not clear how the thirty-day period in subsection (a)(2) and the forty-five-day 
period of subsection (a)(6) were intended to link up and relate.99 As for the limi-
tation to personal property, perhaps the explanation is that the perceived threat 
to creditors caused by ride-through is generally thought to be far less of a concern 
when the collateral is real estate.100 In any case, the limitation to personal prop-
erty is an important piece of the argument that ride-through did persist, and per-
haps has even now been formally authorized, post-BAPCPA as to real estate-
backed loans, as discussed more fully below.101 
Moving along, and of singular importance, is § 521(d). Prior to BAPCPA, 
there was no specific statutory provision inhibiting or precluding the enforcea-
bility of a “bankruptcy filing” or “insolvency” default provision in a security 
agreement or consumer credit contract once the stay was terminated.102 This 
 
property . . . qualify for the protection of § 521(a)(6) even if their claim is for less than the full 
purchase price”). It is also odd that § 521(a)(6) only applies to creditors that possess an “al-
lowed claim,” which generally means its protections will not apply in no asset cases where 
creditors are typically advised that there is no need to file a claim. See TABB, supra note 31, 
§ 7.4, at 654. However, based on a strict reading of the statute, several courts have come to 
just that result. See, e.g., In re Miller, 443 B.R. 54, 57 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“The interpreta-
tion advocated by the Debtor would mean that section 521(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code is 
unavailable for secured creditors in no-asset cases. Although that may seem a strange result, 
the plain meaning of the statute requires such a conclusion.”); In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 
229 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007); cf. infra text accompanying note 281. 
96  11 U.S.C. 521(a)(7). 
97  As in § 362(h), there is a proviso if the trustee, on motion, can demonstrate that the property 
has consequential value or benefit to the estate, in which case, if the lender’s interest is ade-
quately protected, the debtor is required to deliver the property to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 521(a)(*). Notably, there is no requirement of delivery to the creditor, a fact that took on 
significance in Seiffert. See infra text accompanying notes 272–273. 
98  See TABB, supra note 31, at 141 (referring to the two provisions as “confusingly overlap-
ping”). 
99  In neither case, however, is there a remedy for noncompliance beyond termination of the 
stay. See In re Frazier, 599 B.R. 275, 281–82 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2019) (observing that the Code 
does not confer the bankruptcy courts with “authority to craft remedies to assist a creditor in 
enforcing nonbankruptcy law remedies,” nor do they create a remedy if one does not exist 
under applicable nonbankruptcy law). 
100  Obviously, real property values tend to be more stable than personal property, and lenders 
might further be protected via other means, such as required mortgage insurance. 
101  See infra Section IV.C. 
102  Under § 362(c), the stay remains in effect until the earliest of: the time the case is closed, 
the time the case is dismissed, or, in a case involving an individual, the time discharge is 
granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
230 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
potentially afforded the secured lender with the opportunity and ability to exer-
cise its state law remedies, including repossession, regardless of whether there 
was a financial default or significant threat to the collateral once the stay was no 
longer in place.103 Of course, these sorts of so-called ipso facto clauses are gen-
erally reproved of in bankruptcy,104 and specifically made unenforceable by the 
Code in certain designated contexts.105 Therefore, in the circuits that endorsed 
ride-through,106 the courts relied, directly or indirectly, on the general disappro-
bation of ipso facto clauses to conclude that the bankruptcy courts had the dis-
cretionary authority to permit debtors to retain collateral indefinitely so long as 
they remained current on the underlying indebtedness and committed no other 
postbankruptcy default.107 Section 521(d) reverses the bias against the 
 
103  The qualification of only “potentially affording” lenders the ability to invoke nonbank-
ruptcy remedies is that a number of jurisdictions do not recognize “bankruptcy filing,” “insol-
vency,” or other forms of ipso facto clauses to alone form a sufficient basis to trigger acceler-
ation, repossession, or other state law default remedies. See infra note 234 and accompanying 
text. 
104  E.g., In re Residential Cap., LLC, 508 B.R. 851, 862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that, 
while not per se invalid, ipso facto clauses are disfavored). Although generally regarded as 
suspect both in bankruptcy and under state law, see infra notes 234 & 240 and accompanying 
text, such clauses are ubiquitous professional lenders’ loan documents. See Andrea Coles-
Bjerre, Ipso Facto: The Pattern of Assumable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 40 N.M. L. REV. 77, 
77 (2010) (describing the ipso facto clause as “a standard and widespread state law tool”). 
105  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (ipso facto clauses ignored in defining property of the estate); 
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (prohibiting termination or modification of executory contract or unex-
pired lease based on, inter alia, the filing of a bankruptcy case); 11 U.S.C. § 545(1) (allowing 
the trustee to avoid the fixing of a statutory lien that arises either on commencement of a 
bankruptcy case, the debtor’s insolvency, or when the debtor’s financial condition falls below 
a specified level). For discussion on the question of enforceability of ipso facto clauses in 
bankruptcy beyond these specified circumstances, see infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
106  See supra notes 49–53. 
107  Many of the court of appeals decisions only discussed tangentially why the ipso facto 
clause remained unenforceable after the termination of the automatic stay and the closing of 
the case. For example, in Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1545–46 (10th 
Cir. 1989), the bankruptcy court ruled that the debtor’s “discharge in bankruptcy did not put 
the creditor at risk sufficient to invoke the default clause in the security agreement,” and en-
joined the lender “from repossessing the vehicle so long as the debtors ‘remain current on the 
payments, provide adequate insurance, and are not otherwise in default of their contractual 
obligations.’ ” In affirming the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order, the 
court of appeals stated, “We are in accord with the district and bankruptcy courts that the mere 
filing of the petition has not put [the Lender] in any more jeopardy than that which existed 
prior to the filing of the petition. . . . [W]e can see no harm resulting to [the Lender] from the 
order of the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 1546. The effect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling is to 
put the parties where they were prior to bankruptcy. In effect, the ruling in Lowry and other 
cases rendered ipso facto clauses as alone ineffective to serve as grounds for lifting stay, as 
long as the creditor was adequately protected, and ineffective as a basis to invoke state law 
remedies to act postdischarge. The basis for barring enforcement of state law remedies post-
discharge was articulated much more directly in BankBoston v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 
205 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2000). Three months after the chapter 7 case was closed, the secured 
creditor gave notice of intent to repossess the debtor’s vehicle based solely on the breach of a 
default-on-filing clause. Id. at 534. The debtor reopened her case, and the bankruptcy court 
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enforceability of an ipso facto clause in this situation, providing that if a debtor 
fails to comply with § 521(a)(6), or the stay is lifted pursuant to § 362(h), then 
nothing in subsection (d) or elsewhere in the Code shall be deemed to prevent or 
limit the operation of such a provision.108 
Finally, while only relatedly but still importantly relevant to the question of 
the continued existence of ride-through, BAPCPA made a number of changes to 
the reaffirmation provision of the Code, the sum of which make reaffirmation 
more difficult, costly, and arguably less likely to be successful.109 To begin with, 
new subparagraph (2) to § 524(c) requires that the debtor receive an extensive 
set of disclosures called for by new subsection § 524(k). While the only require-
ment is that the debtor receive these disclosures, subparagraph (6) of § 524(k) 
affirmatively instructs that the debtor sign, prior to filing any reaffirmation agree-
ment, a statement of income and expenses, together with the resulting balance 
available to pay the obligation proposed to be reaffirmed.110 If the statement re-
flects that the debtor has insufficient income to make the scheduled payments 
required under the reaffirmation agreement, a sixty-day presumption of undue 
hardship arises under § 524(m)(1) that requires court review and that may serve 
as grounds for the court to reject the proposed agreement in cases where the 
debtor is unable to bear the burden of rebutting the presumption to the court’s 
 
held that the clause was unenforceable and enjoined repossession. Id. The district court af-
firmed. Id. On further appeal to the Second Circuit, the court affirmed on the grounds that 
enforcement would intolerably interfere with the debtor’s fresh start and the court’s earlier 
interpretation in Capital Communications Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 
126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997), of former § 521(2) as a notice statute only. In re Sokolowski, 205 
F.3d at 534–36. For additional support of the argument that ipso facto clauses are not simply 
stayed but invalidated in chapter 7 (at least until 2005), see Scott B. Ehrlich, The Fourth Option 
of Section 521(2)(A)—Reaffirmation Agreements and the Chapter 7 Consumer Debtor, 53 
MERCER L. REV. 613, 691 (2002). Moreover, the enforceability of default-on-filing and other 
kinds of ipso facto clauses varies from state to state. See infra text accompanying notes 234–
235. 
108  As Judge Small noted early on after BAPCPA, § 521(d) “does not create a new statutory 
remedy . . . [nor] write ipso facto clauses into contracts where none exist[; r]ather, it enables 
creditors to proceed under contractual default clauses without limitations imposed by the 
Bankruptcy Code” and, in the case of ride-through, Code interpretation in cases like 
Sokolowski. See In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); accord In re Stein-
haus, 349 B.R. 694, 709–10 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (noting that § 521(d) only removes any 
bankruptcy impediment to the enforceability of an ipso facto clause). 
109  See Gregory M. Duhl, Divided Loyalties: The Attorney’s Role in Bankruptcy Reaffirma-
tions, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 361, 380–81 (2010) (discussing the bankruptcy court’s decision in 
In re Minardi, 399 B.R. 841, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2009)). 
110  11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(6). See generally Ryan W. Johnson, 24 Variations of a Reaffirmation 
Agreement and the Corresponding Actions Required by the Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 
2018, at 26; Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259 
(2007). 
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satisfaction.111 Moreover, when the presumption of undue hardship in 
§ 524(m)(1) arises, the debtor’s attorney must further certify, in addition to the 
affidavit of “no undue hardship” required by § 524(c)(3)(B), that she believes 
that the debtor will be able to make the payments called for under the reaffirma-
tion agreement.112 
Originally, under the 1978 Act, the bankruptcy judge was charged with the 
responsibility to make a determination that a proposed reaffirmation was in the 
debtor’s best interest and would not impose an undue hardship.113 In response to 
complaints that bankruptcy judges were too inclined to find reaffirmation inad-
visable, the 1984 Act shifted that responsibility to the debtor’s attorney, so that 
the court’s involvement in ascertaining whether the reaffirmation was in the 
debtor’s best interest or imposed an undue hardship was limited to cases where 
the debtor was unrepresented in the negotiation of the reaffirmation agreement.114 
Section 524(m)(1) now gets the bankruptcy court back in the game,115 and that 
fact, coupled with the requirement of an additional certification from the debtor’s 
attorney when the presumption of undue hardship arises,116 makes it less likely 
that a borderline reaffirmation agreement will ultimately obtain the necessary 
approval. This, in turn, has opened the door to what has come to be known as 
“backdoor” ride-through, as will be discussed below.117 
The final change to the reaffirmation statute bearing on the ride-through is-
sue is § 524(k)(3)(J)(i)(7), which, in addition to being rather difficult to commit 
to memory, calls for the required disclosure statement to inform the debtor that 
“[e]ven if you do not reaffirm and your personal liability on the debt is dis-
charged, because of the lien your creditor may still have the right to take the 
property securing the lien if you do not pay the debt or default on it.”118 
 
111  11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1). Under the wording of § 524(m)(1), disapproval, which can only 
occur after notice and a hearing, oddly is not mandatory if the debtor fails to rebut the pre-
sumption, but it is fair to imagine that it is most probably likely. See In re Laynas, 345 B.R. 
505, 515 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (pointing out that the statute does not state that the court 
“shall” disapprove if the presumption of undue hardship is not rebutted, and speculating that 
use of the word “may” might be intended to signal a more generalized discretion to disapprove 
an agreement even if the presumption has been rebutted, or that “may” could mean only that 
the court retains discretion to approve an agreement even if the undue hardship presumption 
has not been rebutted). 
112  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(5)(A). 
113  11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1978). 
114  See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333, 354; 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A), (d)(2). 
115  See In re Laynas, 345 B.R. at 511 (“[A]fter the enactment of BAPCPA, the [Bankruptcy] 
Code ‘no longer envisions a reaffirmation agreement standing alone, supplemented only by 
the certification of counsel that the debtor understands the agreement and that it imposes no 
undue hardship.’ ” (quoting David B. Wheeler & Douglas E. Wedge, A Fully Informed Deci-
sion: Reaffirmation, Disclosure and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 789, 800 (2005))). 
116  Supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
117  See infra text accompanying notes 183–191. 
118  11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(J)(i)(7) (emphasis added).  
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Obliquely, this seemed to suggest that a debtor who is not in default of a secured 
debt may retain the property if she stays current on the obligation.119 To date, 
however, it has not been so construed,120 but it looms as yet another basis on 
which to pin the argument that ride-through is far from dead and buried. 
IV.  POST-BAPCPA, PRE-SEIFFERT APPROACHES TO RIDE-THROUGH 
A. Majority View 
While the above provisions would never be held up as an exemplar of clarity 
in legislative prescription,121 given the strongly pro-creditor tenor of the 2005 
Act,122 initially, courts reacted to the changes wrought by BAPCPA with the view 
that ride-through was kaput,123 which is almost certainly what the supporters of 
 
119  See In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 219 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (citing In re Donald, 343 
B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)) (suggesting that this language supports the view that 
the issue of whether to disapprove the reaffirmation agreement is separate and distinct from 
the question whether the debtor satisfied the performance requirements of §§ 521(a)(2) and 
362(h) and the continued viability of ride-through). The court in Donald, however, questioned 
if this was really the intent. In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 539 (“Presumably, the disclosures [in-
cluding this one] are intended to advise debtors of the correct state of the law, but here the 
disclosure appears to be incorrect, or at the very least, misleading.”). 
120  E.g., Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 
2009) (suggesting that the language is too vague to support the position that ride-through sur-
vived, concluding that, “we decline to read one ambiguous sentence as an endorsement of ride-
through where Congress provided explicit information about the statutorily authorized alter-
native to reaffirmation, redemption.”). 
121  See id. at 1110 (“BAPCPA is hardly the very model of a well-drafted statute.”); Patrick M. 
Flatley, BAPCPA: It’s No Gettysburg Address, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2007, at 10; 
see also supra note 41. 
122  See supra note 39. It is, however, important to bear in mind that “creditors” come in dif-
ferent genres. They are not interchangeable, meaning that in a zero-sum game, an advantage 
conferred on one type of creditor must come at the expense, at least to some degree, of other 
creditors. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard 
the Flight from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 353 (2016) (“[T]ypically, a 
debtor’s creditors are not an undifferentiated, monolithic horde. Creditors come in many fla-
vors, secured and unsecured, consensual and nonconsensual, commercial and consumer, just 
to name a few.”). 
123  See, e.g., In re Craker, 337 B.R. 549, 550–51 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Miller, 443 
B.R. 54, 57 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); In re Rice, No. 06-10975, 2007 WL 781893, at *3 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2007); In re Ruona, 353 B.R. 688, 691 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006); In re Stein-
haus, 349 B.R. 694, 700–06 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006); In re Anderson, 348 B.R. 652, 659–60 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 538 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Rowe, 
342 B.R. 341, 345–46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). While ride-through turned out not to be quite as 
dead as some courts thought early on, the view that BAPCPA fundamentally altered the nature 
of the so-called “fourth option,” remains prevalent. See, e.g., In re McCray 578 B.R. 403, 408 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2017) (“BAPCPA ‘specifically rejected’ the ‘ride through’ or ‘stay and 
pay’ option.” (citing Ford Motor Credit v. Hall, No. 16-13333, 2017 WL 3084373, at *4 (E.D. 
Mich. July 20, 2017))). 
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BAPCPA and their lobbyists intended.124 Gradually, however, some doubt began 
to creep into the equation.125 In re Seiffert126 provides a clear and powerful illus-
tration of how, whatever the intent may have been, Congress not only failed to 
get the job done with the provisions described above, but actually exacerbated 
the confusion and disorder over ride-through. Thus, it merits returning to that 
opinion in more detail, but before doing so a review of post-BAPCPA ride-
through jurisprudence is necessarily in order to understand the disorderly back-
drop against which Seiffert was argued and decided. 
The first circuit court decision addressing the issue, In re Dumont,127 was 
characteristic of the tenor of the early post-BAPCPA decisions and, paradigmat-
ically, involved an automobile loan.128 The debtor filed her § 521(a)(2)(A) state-
ment indicating an intent to retain the vehicle and continue making payments.129 
The debtor’s attorney declined the lender’s request to reaffirm and, after the 
debtor’s discharge was granted, the case was closed.130 The lender thereupon re-
possessed the vehicle and the debtor moved to reopen the case and obtain a de-
termination that the lender’s actions constituted a violation of the discharge in-
junction.131 
Even though the debtor was current on the obligation, the bankruptcy court 
held that the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision recognizing ride-through in In re 
Parker132 had been effectively overruled by BAPCPA and denied the motion.133 
On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, noting that every reported 
bankruptcy court decision to that point giving attention to the issue had 
 
124  In re Gregory, 572 B.R. 220, 230 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (noting that Congress intended 
to fix the ride-through loophole); In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 540 (“The court is convinced that 
termination of the ‘ride-through’ option is what Congress intended.”); see Mantas Valiunas, 
Anything but Automatic: Dismissal Under § 521, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 231, 234 (2011) 
(pointing up that “Congress passed BAPCPA in response to growing concerns of abuse of 
bankruptcy procedures by dishonest debtors” and “[the act] is scattered with creditor-friendly 
language to remedy a perceived imbalance in the Bankruptcy Code favoring debtors”); Melissa 
B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 169, 173–74 (2005) (concluding that, post-BAPCPA, non-consensual ride-
through for personal property would be prohibited). 
125  See infra Sections IV.C. & D.; see also In re Gregory, 572 B.R. at 231 (wryly pointing out 
that Congress’s attempt to abrogate ride-through was a failure); infra note 148 and accompa-
nying text. 
126  In re Seiffert, No. 18-43114, 2019 WL 1284299, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019). 
127  Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2009). 
128  See infra note 308, for a possible explanation of why so many of these cases involve vehi-
cle loans. 
129  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1107. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 1107–08. 
132  McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998). 
133  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108. 
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determined that ride-through was eliminated by the 2005 Act.134 On further ap-
peal to the Ninth Circuit, the majority of the panel, after analyzing the changes 
made to §§ 521 and 362 by BAPCPA,135 concluded that the secured lender was 
free to repossess the collateral in question, provided that a right to do so existed 
under applicable state law, and affirmed the lower court decisions.136 Interest-
ingly, as part of its rationale, the court cited the constitutional requirement that 
bankruptcy clauses be “uniform,”137 and noted that it would “raise serious con-
stitutional questions” to reach a conclusion that Congress intended to perpetuate 
the very nonuniform situation that existed pre-BAPCPA due to the circuit split 
over ride-through.138 In light of the confusing muddle soon to emerge over ride-
through in the post-BAPCPA era, that sentiment would prove ironic indeed.139 
Presaging that inconsistency, in a dissenting opinion,140 Judge Graber ex-
pressed her disagreement with the Dumont majority’s assumption that Congress 
intended to ban ride-through on a national basis, and, instead, reasoned that Con-
gress, wittingly or not, actually perpetuated the circuit split.141 She based this 
conclusion on the fact that, when it legislates, Congress is presumed to be aware 
of the current interpretation of a statute and yet, in this instance, Congress chose 
to continue the “if applicable” language in § 521(a)(2)(A) that was so pivotal to 
 
134  Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 383 B.R. 481, 489–90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2008). In fact, however, by the time of the BAP’s decision several courts had already found a 
loophole in BAPCPA through which ride-through might continue under certain circumstances. 
See, e.g., In re Bower, No. 07-60126, 2007 WL 2163472, at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. July 26, 2007); 
In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434, 439–40 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007) (“The Reaffirmation Agreement 
is not in the Debtor’s best interest and, therefore, will not be approved. . . . [S]he may retain 
the Nissan as long as she is current on her payments and insurance obligations.”); In re Ste-
vens, 365 B.R. 610, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Riggs, No. 06-60346, 2006 WL 
2990218, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2006); In re Quintero, No. 06-40163TK, 2006 WL 
1351623, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006). 
135  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1109–10. 
136  Id. at 1115 (highlighting that § 521(d) provides lenders with no substantive remedial 
rights). Having concluded “that [§] 521(a)(2)(C), in conjunction with [§] 362(h), disallows 
ride-through,” the court found it unnecessary to rule on “whether ride-through may also have 
been terminated” by virtue of § 521(a)(6). Id. at 1118; cf. In re Miller 443 B.R. 54, 57 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2011) (finding that § 521(a)(6) is unavailable for secured creditors in no-asset cases 
because, by its terms, it only pertains to creditors who hold “allowed claims”). 
137  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
138  Id. Ironically, that is exactly what BAPCPA has done. See infra Section IV.B. The court 
also rejected the debtor’s attempt to rely on § 524(k)(3)(J)(i)(7) as evidence that Congress 
intended ride-through to continue after BAPCPA. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1117–18; see 
also supra notes 119 & 120 and accompanying text. 
139  See infra Part IV. 
140  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1119 (Graber, J., dissenting). A similar view is expressed in 
Hogan, supra note 85, and discussed further, infra text accompanying notes 335–342. 
141  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1120 (Graber, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the changes to the 
text indicate an intent to perpetuate the extant circuit split, not resolve it.” (emphasis in origi-
nal)). 
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the reasoning of the pre-BAPCPA courts that had approved of ride-through.142 
Noting that while the generally pro-creditor tenor and direction of the statute may 
have been clear, that alone should not be a basis for reading a statute in a partic-
ular fashion.143 Therefore, in the absence of any clearer indication of congres-
sional intent, the dissent concluded that it should be assumed that Congress 
simply decided to side-step the ride-through issue entirely. For this reason, Judge 
Graber believed Parker had not been superseded, and, guided by bankruptcy’s 
overriding purpose to provide the debtor with a fresh start, should continue to be 
followed.144 
Much more recently, a district court in another circuit that had prior to-
BAPCPA recognized the fourth option,145 agreed with the bankruptcy courts of 
its district that Congress intended in 2005 to put a stake through the heart of the 
ride-through option, and was successful in doing so.146 This view seems to be the 
most widely-accepted interpretation in the post-BAPCPA case law,147 at least in 
the case of personal property collateral and when the debtor did not enter into an 
agreement reaffirming the debt or offer to do so on the original contract terms.148 
Some courts, however, expressed reticence and, even early on, there was no una-
nimity of opinion.149 Given the inelegant and circuitous approach employed by 
Congress in addressing ride-though,150 these doubts concerning a sweeping abo-
lition of ride-through should come as no great surprise. It also explains why the 
 
142  Id. at 1120–21. Judge Graber observed that the five-four circuit split on ride-through was 
well known and, yet, Congress failed to provide a clear indication of an intent to resolve the 
split one way or another when it left the critical phase “if applicable” in § 521(a)(2)(A) unal-
tered. Id. at 1121; cf. In re Gregory, 572 B.R. 220, 232–33 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (holding 
that BAPCPA did not change the majority interpretation of § 521(a)(2) as a notice statute with 
respect to home mortgages). 
143  In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1121–22. 
144  Id. (“But the general ‘direction and tenor’ of a statutory amendment is not the correct in-
quiry.”). 
145  Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union U.S. Tr. (In re Price), 370 F.3d 362, 378–79 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
146  Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. Dunn (In re Dunn), 589 B.R. 253, 256–57 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
147  See supra note 123. 
148  See In re Gregory, 572 B.R. 220, 231 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (stating that most courts 
agree that the BAPCPA amendments eliminated ride-through on personal property); In re Jen-
sen, 407 B.R. 378, 389 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that “BAPCPA eliminated the 
debtor’s right to elect ride-through in cases where secured creditors object”). 
149  See, e.g., In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (“[W]hether the reaffir-
mation Agreements should be disapproved or deemed enforceable is an issue that is separate 
and distinct from the issue of whether the Debtors’ act of entering into those Agreements sat-
isfied the ‘performance’ requirements of § 362(h) and § 521(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”); In 
re Laynas, 345 B.R. 505, 517 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (determining that it didn’t need to decide 
what the court described as “the difficult issues relating to ‘ride-through’ ”); In re Donald, 343 
B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (although following the reasoning of earlier decisions 
concluding that ride-through had been terminated, the court noted that “[t]here are good argu-
ments that the ‘ride-through’ option still is available to chapter 7 debtors”); see also supra note 
125; infra notes 183–191 and accompanying text (discussing “backdoor” ride-through). 
150  See supra Section III.B. 
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circumstances under which ride-through is found to persist continue to propa-
gate, as illustrated by In re Seiffert and like cases that preceded it.151 
In the only other court of appeals decision to address the question so far, In 
re Jones, the debtor indicated in his § 521(a)(2) statement of intention that he 
planned to “Continue Payments” with respect to a purchase money vehicle 
loan.152 As in Dumont, the debtor filed a statement of intent to retain his vehicle 
and continue payments throughout and after the forty-five-day period in 
§ 521(a)(6).153 Rather than relying on automatic termination, in an abundance of 
caution, the lender moved to confirm that the stay was terminated so that it might 
repossess the vehicle by virtue of the ipso facto clause in its security agree-
ment.154 The lender’s motion was granted, and the lender proceeded, without no-
tice, to repossess the vehicle.155 The debtor (and his nondebtor spouse) responded 
by bringing an adversary proceeding challenging the lender’s actions.156 The 
bankruptcy court, relying on pre-BAPCPA Fourth Circuit authority,157 ruled that 
the lender did not have the right to repossess the vehicle.158 The district court 
reversed159 and, on further appeal, the Fourth Circuit panel held that its earlier 
decision on the issue recognizing a fourth option under former § 521(2)(A) had 
been superseded by BAPCPA.160 Specifically, the court focused on the “except 
as provided in section 362(h)” addition to the language of former § 521(2)(C),161 
as well as the two new provisions, §§ 521(a)(6) and 362(h), in support of the 
conclusion the ride-through that had been sanctioned by its earlier decision in 
Belanger was now proscribed by virtue of BAPCPA.162 
As to the next issue, whether the lender possessed the authority to repossess 
based solely on the ipso facto clause, the court cited new § 521(d) as establishing 
an exception to the general prohibition against enforcement of such clauses in 
consumer loan agreements in circumstances, such as those present in this case, 
 
151  In re Seiffert, No. 18-43114, 2019 WL 1284299 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019); see infra 
Section IV.D. 
152  DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., LLC v. Jones (In re Jones), 591 F.3d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 
2010). In other words, the statement of intention did not mention anything about redemption 
or reaffirmation. 
153  Id. at 309–10. 
154  Id. at 310. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 310–12 (citing Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 
962 F.2d 345, 347–49 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
158  Id. at 310. The bankruptcy court held that state law required the lender to first give the 
Joneses notice of the right to cure default before repossessing the vehicle. Id. 
159  DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., LLC v. Jones (In re Jones), 397 B.R. 775, 795 (S.D.W. 
Va. 2008), aff’d, 591 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2010). 
160  In re Jones, 591 F.3d at 311–12. 
161  See supra text accompanying note 91. 
162  In re Jones, 591 F.3d at 310–12. The court also noted that the facts did not support the 
exception to this conclusion that some bankruptcy courts had identified where the debtor sub-
stantially complies with §§ 521(a)(2) and 362(h). Id. at 311 n.3; see infra notes 194–210. 
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when the loan is secured by personal property and the debtor has failed to comply 
with §§ 521(a)(6) and 362(h).163 The court also rejected the debtor’s argument 
that the lender’s acceptance of a payment after expiration of the forty-five-day 
period to redeem or reaffirm amounted to a waiver of the ipso facto clause, noting 
that it was a telephone-system payment made prior to the bankruptcy court’s or-
der confirming the lender’s right to repossess.164 Finally, the court found that the 
repossession was not improper by virtue of the lender’s failure to give the Joneses 
notice and an opportunity to cure, as required by West Virginia law, since this 
omission was obviated by the fact that the default in the case—the act of filing 
bankruptcy—could simply not be cured.165 
B.  Not so Fast 
While most post-BAPCPA courts concluded that the language of the Code 
was no longer amendable to creating a ride-through by means of a fourth option 
in the manner that the debtors in Dumont and Jones had attempted, that did not 
mean that ride-through was relegated to the scrap heap of history—far from it.166 
First, of course, was an exception that BAPCPA itself established in circum-
stances where the secured creditor rebuffs the debtor’s attempt to reaffirm the 
debt on the original contract terms.167 This seemingly straightforward rule can, 
in fact, become tricky inasmuch as reaffirmations are essentially negotiations. 
The stipulation that the offer to reaffirm must be on the original contract terms 
limits the ambiguity to some degree. However, if the debtor offers to reaffirm on 
the terms of the original deal, but on condition the lender provide an additional 
postpetition credit accommodation, has the exception been triggered? Alterna-
tively, if the lender dangles an additional extension of credit as inducement for 
reaffirmation of an existing debt, as is not uncommonly the case,168 and the 
 
163  In re Jones, 591 F.3d at 312 (citing In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 538–39 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
2006)). Outside, however, of § 521(d), the rule in the Fourth Circuit remains that “an ipso 
facto clause in an installment loan contract is ‘unenforceable as a matter of law.’ ” In re Husain, 
364 B.R. 211, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 
729 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
164  In re Jones, 591 F.3d at 312 (finding that acceptance of a single automated telephone pay-
ment was insufficient to establish the relinquishment of a known right). 
165  Id. at 313. This was the basis for the bankruptcy court’s holding. Id. at 310. 
166  In re Reed, No. 10-67727, 2011 WL 6328677, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2011) 
(relying on § 524(k) in support of the proposition that BAPCPA implicitly recognizes the ex-
istence of ride-through). Even in Dumont, the court qualified its statement that ride-through 
was no longer available for debtors with the proviso at least among those who did not seek 
reaffirmation. Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
167  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, sec. 305, 119 Stat. 23, 79 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B)). 
168  See 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 68, at 154–55; infra note 373; see also In 
re Jensen, 407 B.R. 378, 389–90 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[N]othing in BAPCPA prevents 
debtors and secured creditors from engaging in what scholars have variously described as 
‘voluntary ride-through,’ ‘creditor acquiescence,’ or ‘informal reaffirmations.’ ”). 
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debtor declines, has the exception in § 362(h) been satisfied? There is no case 
law one way or the other, but certainly an argument that it has can credibly be 
made based on the plain language of the statute, particularly in the case when the 
additional consideration is insisted upon by the lender. 
Next, in terms of a fissure in the wall BAPCPA had attempted to erect to bar 
ride-through, there is nothing in the legislation that prevents what might be 
termed de facto ride-through in situations where, both during and after bank-
ruptcy, the secured lender decides that, so long as the debtor is and remains cur-
rent on payments and there is no particular uninsured threat to the collateral, it 
might be better off simply staying its hand.169 Indeed, given the costs associated 
with repossession and foreclosure, coupled with the notoriously low values re-
ceived in distress sales, it should not come as a surprise that creditor acquies-
cence in de facto ride-through is much more common than might have been pre-
sumed given the level of creditor chirping about the unfairness of ride-through.170 
As discussed below, the prevalence of this not insignificant phenomenon plays 
an important role in the justification for a more uniform and principled approach 
to ride-through proposed in this treatment than certainly exists under the current 
decisional law.171 
Recall that BAPCPA also made reaffirmations more difficult (and expen-
sive).172 This has opened the door, although that was surely not the intent, to yet 
another means for accomplishing ride-through even after BAPCPA, sometimes 
referred to as “backdoor ride-through,” as it entails a sort of end-run around the 
statute.173 In the first case to raise the possibility of this exception, In re Laynas, 
the bankruptcy court was faced with a situation where the debtor stated an inten-
tion to redeem the debt and, in fact, entered into an agreement with the secured 
lender.174 However, the debtor’s financial schedules demonstrated that the 
debtor’s current monthly income less expenses was not adequate to service the 
scheduled payments under the agreement.175 Thus, the sixty-day presumption of 
undue hardship arose under § 524(m)(1) and was not successfully rebutted by 
the debtor at the hearing.176 In considering whether it would be in the debtor’s 
best interest to reaffirm the debt, the court took notice of, in addition to the 
 
169  Sections 362(h) and 521(a)(6) terminate the stay; they do not impose any additional reme-
dial consequence and certainly do not compel the secured creditor to exercise its applicable 
nonbankruptcy remedies. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(h), 521(a)(6). 
170  See infra text accompanying notes 267, 372–373. 
171  See infra Section V.C. 
172  See supra text accompanying notes 109–120. 
173  The first appearance of the term, although not the first application, seems to be in the dis-
trict court’s opinion in DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas, LLC v. Jones (In re 
Jones), 397 B.R. 775, 788 (S.D.W. Va. 2008), aff’d, 591 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2010), a case in 
which, ironically, the facts did not support this limited ride-through option. See also supra text 
accompanying notes 183–191. 
174  In re Laynas, 345 B.R. 505, 508 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006). 
175  Id. at 513. 
176  See supra text accompanying note 111. 
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burden of the required payments, the usual necessity of an automobile to the 
ability to earn a living and the risk that the debtor would lose the vehicle to re-
possession once the stay was terminated.177 As part of its reasoning in determin-
ing ultimately to withhold approval nonetheless, the court observed that it was 
not at all clear that ride-through had been eliminated and, thus, equally unclear 
that the debtor would not be able to retain possession of the property as long as 
the debtor remained current on the debt.178 
The facts of Laynas could also have supported ride-through on the alterna-
tive theory alluded to by the court.179 That is, because the debtor had complied 
with all of her obligations under § 521(a)(2) and 521(a)(6)—she had made a 
proper statement of intention and then did everything in her power to perform in 
accordance therewith—automatic termination of the stay under §§ 521(a)(6) and 
362(h) was never triggered. That being the case, post-bankruptcy repossession 
under the ipso facto clause could not be justified under the savings language of 
§ 521(d) because the conditions necessary for that provision to come into play 
had not been satisfied.180 In fact, several courts have endorsed precisely this rea-
soning in stifling a secured lender’s efforts to repossess free of the automatic stay 
during bankruptcy and immune from the discharge injunction once the stay is 
 
177  See Laynas, 345 B.R. at 516 (citing In re McGrann, 6 B.R. 612 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)) 
(commenting on the fact that in many households the availability of an automobile is a neces-
sity and has alone been found to be the basis to find reaffirmation in the debtor’s best interest). 
178  Id. at 517. The court also observed that applicable state law might bar repossession based 
on an ipso facto clause. Id. (citing In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 349–51 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006)); 
see also infra note 234. 
179  In re Laynas, 345 B.R. at 517. 
180  See supra note 108. 
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terminated.181 However, as discussed below,182 enjoining the lender under the 
automatic stay while the case is pending is quite different from enjoining the 
lender after the case is closed and the stay is terminated. 
A more illustrative decision evincing this willingness to bar the lifting of the 
stay on substantial compliance with §§ 521(a)(2) and (a)(6), and, by so doing, 
effectively sanctioning ride-through, is In re Perez.183 The debtor in In re Perez 
timely filed her § 521(a)(2)(A) statement of intention, indicating a desire to re-
tain and reaffirm, and proceeded to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the 
lender who had earlier financed her vehicle purchase.184 At the hearing on reaf-
firmation, the debtor testified that she was current on payments, had insurance, 
and needed the car in order to get to work.185 After reviewing the facts, the court 
concluded that the reaffirmation agreement was unenforceable because the coun-
sel who had represented the debtor in the negotiation of the agreement had not 
 
181  See, e.g., In re Reed, No. 10-67727, 2011 WL 6328677, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 
2011) (“Since Congress didn’t remove ‘if applicable’ with passage of BAPCPA even though 
this language was heavily relied upon by courts to justify ride-through provisions, such con-
gressional inaction, while not dispositive, suggests a lack of intention to eliminate the ride-
through option espoused by many courts.”); In re Nelson, No. A08-00285-HAR, 2008 WL 
8652595, at *1 (Bankr. D. Alaska Sept. 12, 2008) (explaining the concept of backdoor ride-
through); Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 182–83 (E.D.N.C. 2008) 
(determining that entering into a reaffirmation agreement does not require the debtor to enter 
into an enforceable agreement); In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524, 528–30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 
(holding that substantial compliance with § 521 is sufficient to prevent the lifting of the stay, 
and in effect, permits a backdoor ride-through); id. at 529–30 (finding ride-through permitted 
where debtor filed a statement of intention—though the statement did not indicate an intent to 
reaffirm—and timely entered into a reaffirmation agreement); In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191, 198 
(Bankr. D. Md. 2008) (holding that creditor could not exercise its remedies where the debtor 
timely complies with the requirements of § 521 and § 362(h) even if the court declines to 
approve the reaffirmation agreement); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2007) (holding that because the debtor complied with the requirements of § 521, creditor could 
not repossess the vehicle as long as the debtor remained current on payments and insurance 
obligations); In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225, 231–32 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) (“Because the 
Debtor has fully complied with the requirements under § 521(a)(2), § 521(a)(6), § 521(d), and 
§ 362(h), the remedies contained in each of the subsections are not triggered.”); see also Mimi 
Faller, BAPCPA’s Challenge to Debtors and Creditors Alike: The Murky Law of the “Back-
door Ride-Through” and Enforceability of Ipso Facto Clauses in Consumer Bankruptcies, 23 
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 380, 381(2014) (“BAPCPA did not clear up whether the ride-
through option is still available to debtors.”). But see In re Wright, No. 19-63318, 2020 WL 
5823346, at *10 (Bankr. D. Or. Sept. 9, 2020) (holding that, in a case where the reaffirmation 
agreement was unenforceable because of the absence of the debtors’ attorney’s certification 
under § 524(c)(3), the debtor did not satisfy her obligations under §§ 521(a)(2) and 362(h)(1) 
and ride-through would not be permitted). 
182  See infra text accompanying notes 207–214. 
183  In re Perez, No. 7-10-11417, 2010 WL 2737187, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.M. July 12, 2010). 
184  Id. at *1–2, *6. Notably, the collateral was a five-year old Chevy Equinox, and the courts 
recitation of the facts indicate that the debtor had “agreed to reaffirm [the] debt in the amount 
of $11,471.30, that the interest rate on the reaffirmed debt is 25.917%, and that the original 
purchase price of the [Equinox] was $13,104.29.” Id. at *2. The debtor “estimated” the value 
of the vehicle to be $10,000. Id. 
185  Id. 
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certified that reaffirmation of the debt would not impose an undue hardship on 
the debtor or her dependents as required by § 524(c)(3).186 
The court turned next to the question of ride-through. Observing that, even 
though the reaffirmation agreement could not be approved, the debtor had com-
plied with her obligations under § 521(a)(2) inasmuch as she had timely filed her 
statement of intention and then did everything that was within her control to per-
form in accordance with that intention.187 For this reason, the court concluded 
that the secured lender was not entitled to relief under either § 521(d) or § 362(h), 
noting that the express prerequisites for those provisions to become operational; 
namely, failure to comply with the requirements of § 521(a)(2) or (6), had not 
been met.188 
The court in Perez continued that “the Bankruptcy Code provides no relief 
to [the lender] as a result of there not being an enforceable reaffirmation agree-
ment,” and that the lender “is precluded by the automatic stay from exercising 
any remedies, including the immediate enforcement of any ipso facto clause that 
may exist in the underlying contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(d) or 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(h).”189 Effectively, under a literal interpretation of the statute, an approach 
so favored by the Supreme Court in bankruptcy cases,190 the debtor, who was 
 
186  Id. at *2, *4–5. The debtor’s lawyer signed Part C of the reaffirmation agreement, “certi-
fying that ‘this agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor’ 
and that he ‘fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and consequences of this agreement 
and any default under this agreement.’ ” Id. at *2. However, the lawyer crossed out the second 
certification contained in Part C; namely, that the agreement did not impose an undue hardship 
on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. Id. The debtor’s counsel also did not check the box 
on Part C stating that, although a presumption of undue hardship had been established, in 
counsel’s opinion, the debtor was able to make the payment required under the agreement. Id.; 
see infra text accompanying notes 116–117. 
187  In re Perez, 2010 WL 2737187, at *7 (“To perform the intention to reaffirm the debt, a 
debtor who is represented by counsel must (i) be willing to enter into a reaffirmation agreement 
with the creditor on the original contract terms, (ii) cooperate with the creditor in executing a 
reaffirmation agreement on the original contract terms, or on other terms if mutually accepta-
ble to the debtor and creditor; and (iii) appear at any hearing on disapproval of the reaffirma-
tion agreement, and at the hearing honestly respond to questions and not ask that the agreement 
be disapproved.”). Anything else would be beyond her control. Id. at *7, *9. 
188  Id. at *9. The court concluded it would be absurd to interpret performance under 
§ 521(a)(2)(B) to require that the debtor do things beyond the debtor’s power and control, such 
as compel her counsel to make the necessary certifications or compel the court to approve the 
agreement. Id. at *7. 
189  Id. at *9 (noting that the only relief provided by the Code is relief from stay, the conditions 
for which were not satisfied in this case). 
190  See Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 470 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“The common theme in the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence over the past 
two decades is that courts must apply the plain meaning of the Code unless its literal applica-
tion would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of Congress.” (citing Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989))). 
See generally Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory In-
terpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 
(2007). 
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current in her payments and who had entered a reaffirmation agreement, would 
be permitted to retain the vehicle so long as she committed no acts of default 
other than violation of the ipso facto clause.191 The fact that the court had refused 
to approve the reaffirmation agreement was a separate matter that, in the view of 
the court, in no way altered the conclusion concerning ride-through.192 
It will be recalled that § 362(h)(2) provides an exception to the automatic 
lifting of the stay in circumstances where the creditor refuses to agree to reaffir-
mation on the original contract terms.193 In turn, this would also negate applica-
tion of § 521(d), which becomes operational only upon the debtor’s noncompli-
ance with § 521(a)(6) or § 362(h). A peculiar variation on this theme, as well as 
on the cases permitting ride-through when the court disapproves the proposed 
reaffirmation agreement, is illustrated by the relatively recent opinion in In re 
Nuckoles.194 The case arose out of the debtor’s stated intention to retain her per-
sonal vehicle and reaffirm the underlying debt to Ford Motor Credit Co.195 The 
reaffirmation agreement prepared by Ford reflected a presumption of undue 
hardship based on the debtor’s budget.196 Accordingly, while the debtor and her 
attorney signed the agreement, her lawyer declined, as in In re Perez, to make 
the certification regarding no undue hardship.197 Ford’s counsel advised the 
debtor’s attorney that the § 524(k) disclosures were not complete.198 The debtor’s 
lawyer provided some explanation and requested that the agreement be signed 
by Ford and returned for filing.199 Ford’s counsel declined to do so, refusing to 
endorse or file with the court an agreement he believed to be materially defi-
cient.200 
The debtor was granted her discharge, the case closed, and the stay lifted, all 
on the same day.201 Thereafter, Ford repossessed the vehicle.202 The debtor then 
moved to reopen her case in order to obtain relief for what she contended was 
Ford’s violation of the discharge injunction.203 The debtor’s argument was that, 
having timely agreed to reaffirmation, she had complied with her statutory duties 
 
191  In re Perez, 2010 WL 2737187, at *9. The court found that § 521(a)(6) was no barrier to 
ride-through because the secured creditor had not filed a proof of claim. Id. at *8. The court 
did not explain how this conclusion applied to the discharge injunction as well as the automatic 
stay. See also supra note 107. 
192  In re Perez, 2010 WL 2737187, at *7. 
193  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
194  Nuckoles v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Nuckoles), 546 B.R. 651 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2016). 
195  Id. at 652. 
196  Id. 
197  Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(5)(A). 
198  In re Nuckoles, 546 B.R. at 652. 
199  Id.  
200  Id. 
201  Id. at 652–53. 
202  Id. at 653. 
203  Id. The debtor had, at all times, maintained insurance on the vehicle and never missed a 
payment to Ford. Id. The discharge injunction is imposed by § 524(a) of the Code. Id. at 657. 
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under §§ 521(a) and 362(h), thus depriving Ford of the protection of § 521(d) in 
relation to the enforceability of its ipso facto clause.204 Ford countered that com-
pliance with § 362(h) required the debtor to propose an approvable reaffirmation 
agreement, and that there had been no point to submitting an agreement that the 
court was certain to reject.205 The court sided with the debtor based on the fact 
that, just as in the case where the court affirmatively rejects the reaffirmation 
agreement, the debtor has no control over whether the agreement was enforcea-
ble; in other words, she had done all she could.206 Thus, because the debtor had 
fulfilled all of her statutory duties, § 521(d), by its terms, was never pressed into 
service to preserve Ford’s ipso facto clause. 
The Nuckoles court’s reasoning to this point was on very solid ground and 
in accordance with the overwhelming weight of precedent.207 When the court 
turned, however, to the explanation as to why Ford’s actions violated the dis-
charge injunction once the stay had terminated by operation of law,208 things get 
a little more obscure. Ford argued that in repossessing the vehicle it had merely 
exercised its in rem rights against the property, and thus had not taken action to 
collect on the obligation as a personal liability of the debtor within the meaning 
of § 524(a)(2).209 The court, however, disagreed, finding that Ford’s repossession 
was effectively an unsanctioned in personam action against the debtor “because 
Ford attempted to enforce a contractual provision [the ipso facto clause] voided 
during . . . bankruptcy.”210 
But how was the clause voided by the bankruptcy process? Again, the court’s 
reasoning was that once a debtor complied with her statutory obligations under 
§§ 362(h) and 521(a), § 521(d) was no longer applicable, so the ipso facto clause 
on which Ford relied to justify its repossession was void.211 While it is true that 
§ 521(d) only springs to life if the debtor fails to take timely action under those 
provisions, what is activated is the language in the subsection that nothing in the 
Code should be regarded as limiting the operation of an ipso facto clause,212 and 
nothing in § 521(d) itself should be regarded as justifying limiting such a clause 
in any other circumstance. In other words, the effect of § 521(d), when 
 
204  Id. 
205  Id. The court could not have approved the agreement without the certification of the 
debtor’s attorney, just as in Perez. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
206  In re Nuckoles, 546 B.R. at 655 (“After depriving Nuckoles of the chance to file the Agree-
ment with the Court, Ford cannot turn around and claim that she failed to comply with sections 
362(h) and 521(a).”). 
207  See authorities cited supra note 181. 
208  In re Nuckoles, 546 B.R. at 656–57. Of course, whether the debtor’s substantial compliance 
with her duties under §§ 521(a) and 362(h) also should preclude repossession and foreclosure 
after the case is closed is a somewhat different question, a point the court overlooked. See 
supra note 107. 
209  In re Nuckoles, 546 B.R. at 657. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. at 654–55. 
212  11 U.S.C. § 521(d).  
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applicable, is to save an ipso facto clause if one existed in the underlying loan 
documents, but there is nothing in the provision that can fairly be read to suggest 
it has an affirmative consequence—voiding an ipso facto clause—when it does 
not apply because of the nonsatisfaction of the perambulatory language that con-
trols its operation.213 This is consistent with the received wisdom that, even when 
applicable, § 521(d) does not create an ipso facto provision if one was not in-
cluded in the original loan documentation.214 
In fairness, § 521(d) is hardly a model of clarity, an observation that is true 
of much of BAPCPA.215 Indeed, it is a rather strange provision in the first place 
because it neither adds nor subtracts an ipso facto clause to a consumer credit 
contract, and if one does exist it does not necessarily make it enforceable; that 
determination is made under applicable nonbankruptcy law.216 Therefore, as dis-
cussed below as part of the discussion of a principled resolution for the broader 
issue of ride-through,217 it is largely a provision in hopeless pursuit of a purpose 
that is out-of-step with bankruptcy policy generally, and thus should be merci-
fully repealed. For now, the point is that reading a negative implication into 
§ 521(d) when its terms are never activated would seem to stretch the language 
beyond all reason. 
Rather, in circumstances where the debtor has satisfied all of her statutory 
obligations in relation to collateral under §§ 521(a) and 362(h), the existence of 
ride-through vel non should depend on the state of the law addressing that ques-
tion in the jurisdiction pre-BAPCPA,218 and in certain cases, on state law.219 One 
 
213  Other cases on which the Nuckoles court relied have made the same unwarranted leap of 
faith. See, e.g., In re Perkins, 418 B.R. 680, 681–82 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009) (voiding ipso 
facto clause when debtor “timely complied with the requirements of section 524(c) and 
521(a)(2), and in all respects agreed to reaffirm the debt on the original terms of the contract,” 
but creditor failed to timely file reaffirmation agreement); In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524, 531–32 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (holding that the debtor’s compliance with §§ 362(h) and 521(a) pre-
cluded the creditor from repossessing the collateral without violating the discharge injunction, 
absent a subsequent payment or insurance default), aff’d, 400 B.R. 136 (D. Del. 2009). Other 
courts take the position that once an asset is taken from the bankruptcy estate, even an express 
invalidation of the prohibition against bankruptcy termination clauses is no longer operative. 
See Cahaba Forests, LLC v. Hay, No. 11-CV-423, 2012 WL 380126, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 
2012) (citing Thomas Am. Stone & Bldg., Inc. v. White, 142 B.R. 449 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992)) 
(involving an ipso facto clause invalidated under § 365(e)(1)). 
214  See supra note 108. 
215  See supra notes 40 & 121. 
216  See supra text accompanying note 108; see also Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re 
Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that if “there is no ipso facto clause in 
the [loan documents],” § 521(d) does not allow Ford to “pencil one in” for the lender). 
217  See infra Section V.C. 
218  If the jurisdiction had been a ride-through jurisdiction pre-BAPCPA, then the debtor 
should be able to retain the collateral as long as there is no subsequent monetary default or 
threat to the collateral. See infra note 230 and accompanying text. 
219  See infra notes 233–235 and accompanying text. 
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of the cases that the Perez court relied upon, In re Chim, showcases the point.220 
In re Chim involved (as these cases typically do) a secured auto loan.221 The 
debtor, who was current on the obligation, stated her intent to reaffirm, and in 
fact executed a reaffirmation agreement with the lender.222 Although the agree-
ment raised a presumption of undue hardship, at the reaffirmation hearing her 
lawyer expressed his concern that if the court refused to approve the agreement, 
the lender would declare a default and repossess the vehicle under its ipso facto 
provision once the stay was terminated.223 
The court nonetheless proceeded to reject the agreement as not in the 
debtor’s best interest.224 However, as to the concern about losing the vehicle, the 
court observed that because the debtor had timely complied with all of her obli-
gations under §§ 521(a)(2), 521(a)(6), and 362(h), the stay would remain in place 
for the duration of the case, the vehicle would remain property of the estate, the 
debtor would not be obliged to surrender the vehicle, and the lender would be 
precluded from exercising any remedies based on the ipso facto clause.225 
Turning to the more interesting question of what would happen post-dis-
charge when the stay was lifted by operation of law,226 the court pointed out that 
the debtor’s timely discharge of her duties under § 521(a)(2) negated application 
of the new BAPCPA provisions that would have allowed the lender to exercise 
its state law remedies.227 That being so, the court found that it would be necessary 
to resort to pre-2005 Act precedent to resolve the issue.228 In this case, because 
the bankruptcy court was situated in the Fourth Circuit, the governing precedent 
was the circuit court’s decision in In re Belanger.229 In that decision, of course, 
the court recognized the fourth option under former § 521(2) and held that a 
debtor who is current on the payments under the loan secured by the property 
may retain the property without reaffirming the debt by remaining current and 
that “a default-on-filing clause in an installment loan contract was unenforceable 
 
220  In re Perez, No. 7-10-11417, 2010 WL 2737187, at *6 n.15 (Bankr. D.N.M. July 12, 2010) 
(relying upon In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191, 198 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008)).  
221  In re Chim, 381 B.R. at 192. That fact is likely not coincidence. See infra note 308 and 
accompanying text. 
222  Id. at 193. 
223  In re Chim, 381 B.R. at 193–94. 
224  Id. at 195, 199. The debtor conceded that the presumption of undue hardship in § 524(m)(1) 
applied in the case and was unable to rebut it to the court’s satisfaction. Id. at 195. 
225  Id. at 198 (citing In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Stevens, 365 
B.R. 610 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting this holding was in accord with several other bank-
ruptcy court decisions); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007)). 
226  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (providing that the stay terminates on the earliest of the time the 
case is closed, the time the case is dismissed, or in the case of an individual debtor, the time a 
discharge is granted or denied). 
227  In re Chim, 381 B.R. at 199. 
228  Id. 
229  See id. at 198–99. 
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as a matter of law.”230 Thus, ride-through would be allowed in the instant case, 
but not because § 521(d) had voided the ipso facto clause, but because § 521(d) 
was not applicable on the facts to save the ipso facto clause, and circuit precedent 
rendered such a clause invalid.231 Moreover, and somewhat oddly, ride-through 
would be permitted notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit’s own holding that its 
decision in In re Belanger had been supplanted by BAPCPA.232 But what about 
cases arising in one of the four circuits that did not recognize the fourth option? 
In those situations, bankruptcy law would not invalidate an ipso facto clause as 
a matter of law. Thus, the determination of the creditor’s right to repossess the 
collateral would depend on state law.233 As should not come as a surprise, state 
law is decidedly mixed about enforceability of provisions making insolvency or 
the filing of bankruptcy an event of default in connection with consumer credit 
contracts. For example, in Massachusetts, a default provision in a retail install-
ment credit contract is only enforceable to the extent that the default is material 
and consists of the buyer’s failure to make a required payment or the occurrence 
of an event that substantially impairs the value of the collateral.234 By contrast, if 
no such prohibition exists in a particular jurisdiction, then a secured lender would 
presumably be successful in seizing the collateral based on the argument that 
Ford Motor relied on Nuckoles.235 This fact illustrates the critical importance of 
the distinction between saying § 521(d) voids an ipso facto clause and saying 
§ 521(d) does not apply because the debtor fulfilled all of her duties under 
§ 521(a). Not to be overlooked, of course, is that the former statement, if true, 
would provide a single uniform result. The latter statement, which is sadly true, 
 
230  Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (citing Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 984–85 (4th 
Cir.1984)). 
231  In re Chim, 381 B.R. at 199. 
232  DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams., LLC v. Jones (In re Jones), 591 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 
2010); see supra text accompanying notes 152–165. 
233  See In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 350 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“Upon termination of the stay, 
however, the Creditor’s rights are those under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”). Applicable 
nonbankruptcy law in this case was Kansas state law, which like many states, requires either 
that the consumer fails to make a payment required by the agreement or the prospect of pay-
ment or realization of collateral is significantly impaired in order for a creditor to enforce the 
terms of a consumer credit contract. Id.; see also infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
234  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A(a) (2019), https://malegislature.gov/laws/general-
laws/partiii/titleiv/chapter255b/section20a [https://perma.cc/XV5L-HLE8]. The Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, which has been adopted in eleven states, contains a similar provision. 
U.C.C.C. § 5.109 (REFS & ANNOS 1974). This provision was applicable in Rowe. See supra 
note 223. Other states permit a creditor to declare a default and repossess based on the filing 
of bankruptcy or other nonmonetary default not involving a threat to the collateral. A table 
comparing state ipso facto laws is set forth in DANIEL A. AUSTIN & DONALD R. LASSMAN, 
REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES 147–56 (Am. Bankr. Inst. 
2d. ed. 2010) (Appendix F). 
235  That is, that the creditor is simply exercising its in rem state law rights and remedies against 
the collateral. See Nuckoles v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Nuckoles), 546 B.R. 651, 657 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2016). 
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provides an inconsistent result dependent on the fortuity of where the case was 
filed and, in some instances, applicable nonbankruptcy law.236 
Also, even among jurisdictions that recognize such provisions as enforcea-
ble, it is not uncommon for them to be closely regulated under doctrines like 
waiver and estoppel,237 and given the jurisprudence regarding the nonenforcea-
bility on public policy grounds of clauses attempting to restrict a party’s ability 
to file bankruptcy,238 one might at least plausibly construct a similar argument 
with respect to a “default on bankruptcy filing” clause.239 Though “disfavored” 
generally,240 even the federal courts are not in unison about the enforcement of 
an ipso facto clause that is not specifically rendered inoperative by the Code.241 
In short, in addition to the lack of uniformity from circuit to circuit, even in those 
four circuits that did not recognize ride-through, as well the two circuits that did 
not address ride-through pre-BAPCPA, the extent of disuniformity and unpre-
dictability is considerable to say the least. 
 
236  See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
237  See Braucher, supra note 83, at 477. 
238  E.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 
1026 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that contractual terms that directly or indirectly proscribe seek-
ing bankruptcy protection contravene public policy and are unenforceable); Nat’l Hockey 
League v. Moyes, No. CV-10-01036-PHX, 2015 WL 7008213, at *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 12, 2015) 
(same). 
239  Just such an argument was rejected in 110 Parklands, LLC v. Gillon, but the filing that 
triggered the default was not by the defendant, a guarantor, but that of a third party, the primary 
obligor. 110 Parklands, LLC v. Gillon, No. CV-16-6028988-S, 2018 WL 1659663, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2018). 
240  See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
241  Compare In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 153 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (concluding 
that the bar on ipso facto clauses in bankruptcy extends beyond situations explicitly covered 
by the Code), aff’d, 532 Fed. Appx. 264 (3d Cir. 2013), aff’d, 729 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 729 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2013), and In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2007) (“The general rule is that an ipso facto clause in an installment loan contract is ‘unen-
forceable as a matter of law’ ” (quoting Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Belanger (In re Bel-
anger), 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 1992))), with U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. (In 
re AMR Corp.), 730 F.3d 88, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the specificity of the provisions 
of the Code rendering ipso facto clauses nugatory demonstrate that Congress knows how to 
limit or negate the effect of such clauses when it chooses to do so), and In re Gen. Growth 
Props., Inc., 451 B.R. 323, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting the argument that a contract 
provision imposing a default interest rate upon bankruptcy filing was an unenforceable ipso 
facto clause). The court in In re General Growth did, however, go on to suggest that there are 
circumstances where a court might decline to enforce a bankruptcy default provision, even in 
the absence of an express provision, where the clause in question impairs the debtor’s ability 
to attain a fresh start. In re General Growth, 451 B.R. at 330. Because this is almost always 
going to be true in consumer cases—In re General Growth was not—it suggests a strong neg-
ative bias when it comes to ipso facto clauses. 
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C. Real-Property Collateral Ride-Through 
Sections 521(a)(6) and 362(h), and by extension § 521(d),242 are restricted to 
circumstances where the debtor not only is an individual but also where the col-
lateral consists of personal property.243 Collectively, these provisions are most 
plausibly read to suggest that ride-through with respect to real property collateral 
survived enactment of BAPCPA, at least in those circuits that had recognized 
court-protected ride-through prior to enactment of the 2005 Act.244 The key to 
this conclusion hinges on the proper construction of § 521(d). On initial reading, 
that provision might be read as extending its imprimatur to all ipso facto clauses 
in situations where a debtor fails to comply with her obligations under 
§ 521(a)(2)(A) & (B).245 However, as my former colleague, the late Jean 
Braucher, correctly predicted, application of the savings provision of § 521(d) is 
limited to ipso facto clauses in the case of agreements covered by §§ 521(a)(6) 
and 362(h).246 Of course, as noted, these two provisions, by their terms, only 
relate to and govern loans secured by personal property collateral. 
The opinion of the bankruptcy court in In re Waller is illustrative. The debt-
ors and the mortgagee on two loans encumbering the debtors’ residence reached 
agreement on reaffirmation of the debts.247 Because the debtors’ income net of 
other expenses did not appear sufficient to support the scheduled payments under 
the reaffirmation agreements, the presumption of undue hardship arose under 
§ 521(m)(1).248 After the required hearing, the court determined that reaffirma-
tion of the mortgage debts was not in the debtors’ best interest and refused to 
approve them.249 The court continued, however, that because the debtors were 
current on both obligations, this did not mean they would lose the property. Cit-
ing a decision rendered a year earlier that followed the logic described above,250 
 
242  The actual terms of § 521(d) are not limited to personal property; however, as noted earlier 
in connection with the more common case where the court rejects a reaffirmation agreement, 
§ 521(d) is catalyzed by the debtor’s failure to comply with §§ 521(a)(6) and 362(h). See supra 
note 108. 
243  11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(6), (d), 362(h). In contrast, § 521(a)(2) refers to debts secured by any 
property of the estate. Id. § 521(a)(2). 
244  E.g., In re Gregory, 572 B.R. 220, 231–32 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (noting that BAPCPA 
appears to codify ride-through in the case of a debtor’s home). 
245  Section 521(d) refers to § 362(h), which in turn spells out the consequences of failing to 
comply with § 521(a)(2)(A) & (B), which apply to all secured debts. The key is that the lan-
guage preceding the reference to termination of the stay for such failure is limited to personal 
property. 
246  In re Nelson, No. A08-00285-HAR, 2008 WL 8652595, at *2 (Bankr. D. Alaska Sept. 12, 
2008) (“With respect to the Wells Fargo real estate loan, I do not believe [the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in] Parker has been overruled.”). 
247  In re Waller, 394 B.R. 111, 112 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). 
248  Id. 
249  Id. at 113 (finding that the testimony of Mrs. Waller that she was now working part-time 
at a golf shop and occasionally did substitute teaching was not enough to rebut the presumption 
because of the sporadic and unreliable nature of the additional income). 
250  In re Wilson, 372 B.R. 816, 820 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007). 
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and indulging the presumption that when Congress acts, it acts with knowledge 
of the law,251 the court concluded that the changes made by BAPCPA did not 
eliminate ride-through with respect to real estate-based loans.252 
How important to the outcome was it in Waller that debtors had entered into 
the reaffirmation agreements, even though they were not approved? Unlike in 
the case of personal property loans,253 the answer seems to be “not essential.” 
Consider the opinion of the bankruptcy court in In re Wilson, the case on which 
the Waller court relied.254 The debtor initially indicated her intention to reaffirm 
two debts to the same lender, each secured by a mortgage on her Surfside, South 
Carolina, condominium.255 Subsequently, her counsel notified the lender that, on 
further consideration, the debtor had decided not to reaffirm the two mortgage 
notes.256 Instead, the debtor filed a statement that she intended to retain posses-
sion of the condominium and remain current on the two obligations.257 The mort-
gagee responded with a motion seeking an order compelling the debtor to sur-
render the property, redeem, or reaffirm.258 
The court conceded that BAPCPA appeared to limit ride-through in the case 
of personal property-secured loans.259 However, as §§ 362(h) and 521(a)(6) do 
not apply to real property collateral, the court concluded that a debtor’s rights 
with respect to loans secured by real property was unaffected by BAPCPA.260 
Thus, the fact that the debtor had not actually entered into a reaffirmation 
 
251  In re Waller, 394 B.R. at 114 (citing In re Bennet, No. 06–80241, 2006 WL 1540842, at 
*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 26, 2006)). 
252  Id. To this extent then, the court concluded that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Home 
Owners Funding Corp. of America v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 
1992), remains intact, recognizing the right of debtors to continue current payments on debts 
secured by real property and retain the collateral established. Id. Specifically, the addition of 
the proviso in § 521(a)(2)(C) “except as provided in section 362(h)” had no effect on the hold-
ing in Belanger because § 362(h), by its terms, only applies to personal property loans. Accord 
In re Hill, No. 15-02606-HB, 2015 WL 5194589, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2015) 
(“[BAPCPA] made changes to the ‘ride-through’ option as it relates to personal property only 
and did not affect the viability of the ‘ride-through’ option for debts secured by real prop-
erty.”); In re Caraballo, 386 B.R. 398, 402 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008) (holding that because pre-
BAPCPA, Second Circuit precedent provided for the ride-through generally, the option for 
ride-through in the case of real property was unaffected by BAPCPA); see also In re Bennet, 
No. 06-80241, 2006 WL 1540842, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 26, 2006) (finding debtors 
can retain real property without redeeming or reaffirming as long as debtor remains current). 
253  In the case of personal property, the entering into a reaffirmation agreement (or willingness 
to do so) is necessary to establish compliance with § 521(a)(2); i.e. that the debtor did every-
thing within her control. See supra text accompanying notes 179–190. 
254  In re Waller, 394 B.R. at 113 (citing In re Wilson, 372 B.R. at 820). 
255  In re Wilson, 372 B.R. at 817. 
256  Id. 
257  Id.  
258  Id. 
259  Id. at 818. 
260  Id. at 819 (“Limiting a debtor to the three choices of surrender, redeem or reaffirm for real 
property would impair the debtor’s ability to obtain a fresh start, which is one of the primary 
purposes of bankruptcy law.”). 
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agreement, as would later be true of the debtors in Waller, would not prevent her 
from retaining her property so long as she stayed current on the obligations.261 
Once more, however, this interpretation does not mean necessarily that ride-
through for real property loans is permitted everywhere. That would be too easy. 
Instead, some courts have held that the fact that BAPCPA did not address ride-
through for loans secured by real estate means that pre-BAPCPA circuit prece-
dent still controls—in much the same way as it does in the cases involving back-
door ride-through.262 In those circuits where the court of appeals had held that 
former § 521(2) required the debtor to choose exclusively from the three options 
listed, ride-through was precluded without regard to the nature of the collat-
eral.263 Thus, these courts have concluded that, because the additions to the Code 
relating to ride-through established by BAPCPA relate only to personal property, 
this signals Congress’s intention to abide by existing circuit precedent when the 
collateral is other than personal property.264 Conversely, certainly the argument 
can be made with some force that if, with full knowledge of the ride-through 
disagreement among the circuits, Congress affirmatively only eliminated ride-
through for personal property loans then, by implication, it sanctioned ride-
through in the case of real estate loans.265 Although the court in In re Linderman 
rejected just such an argument,266 this construction is further buttressed by plac-
ing BAPCPA in its historical context, which was before the Great Recession of 
2008, when it was still believed that real estate values generally only moved in 
one direction.267 So, the final chapter has surely yet to be written. 
 
261  Id. at 820. 
262  See supra text accompanying notes 218–223. 
263  See supra note 61. 
264  In re Harris, 421 B.R. 597, 600 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010) (applying the holding and rationale 
of Taylor v. AGE Federal Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993), 
and rejecting ride-through in the current case); In re Linderman, 435 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2009) (accepting the argument that when a debt is secured by real property, the pre-
BAPCPA split among the circuits still exists and applicable circuit precedent controls). 
265  See In re Vistacare Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When Congress enacts 
legislation, it is presumed to act with knowledge of the ‘existing law and judicial concepts.’ ” 
(quoting Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 112 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
266  In re Linderman, 435 B.R. at 718. 
267  See In re Wilson, 372 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (making the point that the risk 
of rapid depreciation of the collateral is far less pronounced for lenders with liens on real 
property, “as real property does not typically rapidly depreciate”); see also Marianne B. 
Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car? Some Thoughts on Collateral 
Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 471, 478 (2002) (mak-
ing the point that secured lenders commonly acquiesce in ride-through for home mortgage 
loans, presumably because of the “high value and low mobility of real estate collateral, plus 
mortgage insurance and state anti-deficiency laws make personal liability disposable to them” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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D.  Seiffert Redux 
In Seiffert, it will be recalled,268 the secured lender, 21st Mortgage, filed two 
motions: to compel the debtors’ compliance with their amended § 521(a)(2) 
statement, and to delay entry of discharge pending such compliance, respec-
tively.269 It should also be borne in mind that the Seifferts were current on their 
payments to 21st Mortgage and, of critical importance, the underlying loan doc-
umentation did not contain an ipso facto clause.270 Turning first to the motion to 
compel the Seifferts to “surrender” the mobile home, as indicated in their 
amended statement of intention, 21st Mortgage contended that the debtors were 
obligated under both §§ 521(a)(2) and (a)(6) to relinquish possession of the mo-
bile home, meaning literally to turn it over to 21st Mortgage.271 The court disa-
greed, noting that the Code does not define the term “surrender.”272 Starting with 
the premise that Code provisions are to be construed in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning, the court found that, in the context of §§ 521(a)(2) and 362(h), 
the meaning of the term “surrender” is not interchangeable with the term “de-
liver,” the latter being the term the Code intentionally employs when contem-
plating physical turnover of possession.273 
The court next turned to § 521(a)(6), which applied because the security in-
terest in question was a purchase money lien.274 That provision provides, of 
 
268  See supra text accompanying notes 1–14. 
269  In re Seiffert, No. 18-43114, 2019 WL 1284299, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019). 
270  This is unusual, indeed very rare, when the lender is a commercial entity regularly engaged 
in credit transactions. See supra note 104. 
271  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *4 (“21st Mortgage argues that the term ‘surrender’ is 
sufficient, by itself, to enable this Court to order the Debtors to affirmatively deliver the Mo-
bile Home to 21st Mortgage.”). 
272  Id. at *4. 
273  Id. (citing Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 18–19 (1st 
Cir. 2006)); see also In re Frazier, 599 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2019) (holding that the 
Bankruptcy Code does not give the court the authority to craft remedies to assist a creditor in 
enforcing nonbankruptcy law remedies where no right to repossess exists because the debtor 
is current on payments); In re Gregory, 572 B.R. 220, 232 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2017) (observing 
that “when Congress intend[s] . . . a party [to] surrender property ‘to’ another [person or en-
tity], it [knows] how to do so”); In re Stephens, No. 09-62630, 2013 WL 1305576, at *8 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y., Mar. 23, 2013) (holding that “surrender” is not synonymous with “deliv-
ery”); cf. Valez v. EZ Rent a Car Inc. (In re Valez), 601 B.R. 351, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2019) 
(finding that a debtor’s timely filing of a statement of intention to retain a vehicle and continue 
making payments was sufficient to satisfy § 521(a)(2)(A) such that the stay remained in place 
at least until thirty days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors). But see In re 
Marquez, No. 17-60594-RBK, 2017 WL 5438306, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) 
(holding that “a violation of § 521(a)(2) should generally result in the stay being lifted, but in 
unusual circumstances, such as this [case], where the debtor has not even attempted to comply 
with his duties under [§ 521(a)(2) of] the Code,” the court may take further action in order “to 
ensure that the Code and . . . [circuit precedent] are effectuated”); In re Trussel, No. 1:12-bk-
10001-KSJ, 2015 WL 1058253, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2015) (ruling that surrender 
may be compelled when a debtor does not “attempt, in good faith, to reach a reaffirmation 
agreement with the creditor”). 
274  See supra note 95, concerning some uncertainty over when § 521(a)(6) applies. 
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course, that a debtor who has neither redeemed nor entered into a reaffirmation 
agreement shall not retain possession of the collateral.275 Moreover, the final 
paragraph of the subsection provides that, on motion of the trustee, the debtor 
may be ordered to deliver the collateral.276 Nonetheless, once more 21st Mort-
gage found itself thwarted. First, the court found that the remedy available to the 
secured creditor in § 521(a)(6) is not possession necessarily, but rather relief 
from stay so as to be able to exercise its state law rights, which could include the 
right to repossess.277 Second, the requirement of delivery of collateral in the final 
paragraph is limited to delivery to the trustee; i.e., it does not provide a remedy 
for creditors.278 Finally, the court noted that other decisions have circumvented 
the language in the first sentence of the subsection that a debtor “shall not retain 
possession” by holding that § 521(a)(6) is only applicable when the creditor is 
the holder of an “allowed claim.”279 Because this was a no-asset case 21st Mort-
gage was not required to and had not filed a claim.280 However, the court did not 
rely on this technicality to deny 21st Mortgage relief, pointing out that this literal 
reading of the statute leads to an absurd result and that, in any event, it was not 
necessary to decide the applicability of § 521(a)(6) in this case based on the “al-
lowed claim” argument given the court’s ruling on the other grounds.281 
Turning to § 521(d), the remedial provision for noncompliance with 
§§ 521(a)(6) and 362(h), the court noted that its terms allow for the creditor to 
exercise all of its state law rights and remedies free of the automatic stay, includ-
ing enforcement of an ipso facto clause, provided one was included in the loan 
documents.282 Because 21st Mortgage’s retail installment credit contract did not 
include such a clause, and the Seifferts were not otherwise in default, 21st Mort-
gage would have no right to take action against the debtors or the mobile home 
under state law unless and until the occurrence of a subsequent event of de-
fault.283 Thus, the relief available under the court’s interpretation of 
§ 521(a)(6)—relief from stay so as to be able to exercise state law rights—was 
of no present utility because 21st Mortgage had no state law right to seize the 
collateral. 
Moving on to the companion motion to delay entry of discharge, the court 
observed, initially, that 21st Mortgage had no grounds to seek denial of discharge 
under § 727(a).284 The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, in turn, call for the 
 
275  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6). 
276  Id. 
277  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *6. 
278  Id. at *5. 
279  Id.; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
280  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *5. 
281  Id. 
282  Id. at *6. 
283  Id. at *2, *6. Thus, the remedy provided by § 521(d) did not benefit 21st Mortgage. See In 
re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 710 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (pointing out that where there is no 
ipso facto clause in the contract, § 521(d) does not allow the secured lender to pencil one in). 
284  In re Seiffert, 2019 WL 1284299, at *6–7. 
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prompt entry of the order of discharge upon expiration of the time fixed for filing 
a complaint objecting to discharge, except in certain circumstances where entry 
may be delayed.285 Because a debtor’s failure to execute her duties under 
§ 521(a)(2) is not among those specified circumstances warranting delay in entry 
of the discharge order, the court determined it had no alternative but to deny that 
motion as well.286 
The logic and soundness of the reasoning in Seiffert is unassailable. While 
its holding will apply only in the rare circumstance where the consumer credit 
contract or security agreement is devoid of an ipso facto clause,287 it represents 
yet another category of potential cases where ride-through has been found to en-
dure notwithstanding BAPCPA. Thus, the chaos and serendipity surrounding 
when ride-through is available and when it is not continues to get worse, a state 
of affairs that serves only to undermine the effectiveness of the bankruptcy order 
for its participants and the integrity of the system overall. So, it seems clear 
something needs to be done. 
V.  WHAT TO DO? 
A.  The Policy Cases for and Against Ride-Through 
1.  Pro-Creditor Position 
In response to the oft-cited lament that preclusion of installment redemption 
will inevitably lead to situations where a chapter 7 debtor will possess no viable 
method of retaining possession of critical secured collateral,288 creditors point 
out that a debtor may avoid such an untenable position by initially filing a peti-
tion for bankruptcy under chapter 13 or converting an existing chapter 7 proceed-
ing to a chapter 13 proceeding. Chapter 13 is designed to provide a debtor with 
a fresh start through rehabilitation; a debtor retains her property in return for an 
obligation to pay all or a portion of her debts from future income under a chapter 
13 plan. By contrast, chapter 7 provides a fresh start through liquidation of the 
debtor’s property. As such, under proper circumstances, chapter 13 authorizes 
redemption by installment payments over an objection by the creditor (a “cram 
 
285  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c). 
286  In re Seiffert, WL 1284299, at *6 (describing the circumstances in Rule 4004(c) authoriz-
ing a delay in granting a discharge as “both specific and limited”). But see In re Linderman, 
435 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (ordering the debtor to select between the three 
available options and suspended discharge until the court could verify that the debtor had 
complied with the court’s order). 
287  See supra note 104. 
288  See Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (sustaining ride-through based on the importance of the fresh start, the inadequacy 
of redemption and reaffirmation, and the importance of the collateral—often a vehicle—to the 
debtor’s fresh start). 
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down”),289 the very same result sought to be achieved in ride-through situations. 
Moreover, this opportunity exists even in a state of affairs where there has been 
a prebankruptcy default.290 
Because repayment under chapter 13 is favored over chapter 7 liquidation as 
a matter of public policy,291 the argument continues that permitting any ride-
through in chapter 7 runs counter to the norms sought to be advanced under the 
current bankruptcy regime. Thus, creditors point out that not only is there is an 
alternative to ride-through, but one that affords secured lenders with greater pro-
tection since discharge is not granted until the debtor completes the plan.292 Cred-
itors also maintain that the existence of ride-through makes it unlikely that a 
debtor would ever elect to reaffirm a debt,293 thus depriving them of a comparable 
level of protection as exists under chapter 13.294 
Given the existence of a legislatively authorized mechanism by which a 
debtor may retain property by keeping payments current, the argument is that it 
would be improper, if not incongruous, to infer congressional approval of a 
“cram down” option in chapter 7 that offers creditors less protection and higher 
risk. As noted by Judge Shadur in his dissent in In re Boodrow, “when Congress 
 
289  Under § 1325(a)(5), a plan is confirmable as to a secured claim if it proposes to pay the 
holder the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of not less than the allowed amount of the 
claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). BAPCPA added the requirements that the payments be in equal 
installments and assure the secured party of adequate protection during the plan period. Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, tit. 3, sec. 
309, § 1325(a)(5)(B), 119 Stat. 23, 83. The latter requirement could, in a situation where the 
collateral is depreciating rapidly in value, require payments actually in excess of the value of 
the secured claim within the meaning of § 506(a)(2). BAPCPA also made it more difficult to 
confirm a plan involving claims secured by vehicles by prohibiting strip down of the claim to 
the value of the collateral in most cases. See infra note 301. 
290  See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). 
291  The legislative history to the 1978 Act provided as follows: 
The premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of the bankruptcy law 
should be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repayment under chapter 13, Ad-
justment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income; and finally, whether the debtor uses 
chapter 7, Liquidation, or chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of an Individual, bankruptcy relief 
should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start. 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1977, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
1977 WL 9628, at *118. 
292  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). Under stringent conditions a “hardship discharge” may be granted 
prior to completion of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b). 
293  See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 60 (Shadur, J., dissenting) (observing that it would be the 
rare debtor indeed who would elect reaffirmation or redemption over the unstated fourth op-
tion, which neither requires a large lump sum payment (redemption) nor resuscitates personal 
liability for the underlying debt post-discharge (reaffirmation)). 
294  This is even more true after 2005, since BAPCPA adopted a number of amendments mak-
ing chapter 13 more restrictive and less inviting for debtors and more favorable for creditors, 
particularly secured creditors. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Rethinking Chapter 13, 59 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1, 9, 27 (2017) (“The cumulative effect of [the changes made to chapter 13 by BAPCPA] 
has been to make it more difficult to confirm and complete a chapter 13 plan. Moreover, even 
when a debtor is able to do so, these new advantages flowing to secured creditors largely come 
at the expense of their unsecured counterparts.”). 
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wants to provide for a ‘cram down’ that enables a debtor to keep property over 
the objection of a secured creditor, it knows full well how to do so.”295 
The pro-creditor argument would also dismiss as chimerical the concern 
over a debtor’s involuntary surrender of the collateral. Most secured creditors, it 
would be noted, will prefer to enter reaffirmation agreements containing identi-
cal terms to the original agreements so as to avoid the costs associated with ac-
cepting back, and then disposing of, surrendered collateral.296 This would be par-
ticularly true in situations where the debtor is current in payments since it 
enhances the very real possibility that the creditor will actually receive more by 
agreeing to reaffirmation than it would if it liquidated the collateral now—even 
to the point of full satisfaction of the indebtedness. The point to be made from 
the perspective of secured creditors is that disallowance of nonconsensual ride-
through is unlikely to result in the forced surrender of the debtor’s property in 
very many cases. 
The bottom line is that while most lenders would concede that redemption is 
rarely a realistic option,297 they would maintain that the system allows for other 
alternatives that permit the debtor to avoid losing property that may be essential 
to earning a living or caring for dependents. To be sure, those alternatives may 
not be quite as attractive as complete immunity from personal liability on the 
underlying debt. Nonetheless, it would be pointed out that these less debtor-
friendly options still accomplish the goal of facilitating retention of critical prop-
erty, but do so without violently skewing the nature of the deal so as place on the 
secured lender the same quantum of noncontracted-for risk as is associated with 
ride-through. Finally, it would be argued that, by maintaining the debtor’s in per-
sonam liability, the removal of ride-through aligns debtors’ incentives in terms 
of protecting and maintaining collateral with the most favorable economic out-
come for lenders. This, in turn, the creditors’ position would continue, should 
 
295  In re Boodrow, 160 F.3d at 60. 
296  This should come as no surprise. Requiring reaffirmation in cases where the debtor is cur-
rent in payments and otherwise fulfilling the original bargain adds significant risk and expense 
to the debtor’s fresh start without adding any additional value. See Ehrlich, supra note 107, at 
663 (“Common sense, as well as commercial reality, lead to the conclusion that no rational 
secured creditor would declare a default, accelerate the balance due, and repossess collateral 
merely because the loan has become nonrecourse as a result of the debtor being legally re-
leased from liability, as in a bankruptcy discharge . . . .”). But see infra note 304. 
297  See Bank of Bos. v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1998) (“We do not doubt 
that redemption is beyond the means of most chapter 7 debtors, and that chapter 7 debtors 
wishing to retain consumer goods on which they owe money will, as a practical matter, be 
compelled to enter into reaffirmation agreements with their secured creditors.”). Indeed, a re-
cent study found that only 1.2 percent of debtors in their national sample indicated an intent 
to redeem in their § 521(a)(2)(A) statement. See Pamela Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, 
55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 313 fig.1 (2020). The authors found the low number is all the 
more remarkable in light of the growing market of lenders willing to finance chapter 7 debtor 
redemptions. Id. at 315. 
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lead to a lower cost of credit for debtors ex ante,298 which, it would be urged, is 
good for debtors as a group and, a lower cost of capital, good for the economy 
as a whole.299 
2. Pro-Debtor Position 
As addressed above, the strongest (and loudest) argument in favor of ride-
through is to protect debtors from involuntary and/or imprudent reaffirmations 
of unsecured debt as the only practicable way of retaining essential property, like 
a home or automobile.300 It is true that the Code’s mechanism for installment 
redemption in individual debtor cases is chapter 13. However, modification of 
home mortgage loans has always been prohibited by § 1322(b)(2), and BAPCPA 
itself imposed a serious impediment in the way of retaining an automobile in this 
fashion by precluding strip down of most consumer vehicle loans.301 Consumer 
 
298  See Barry E. Adler, The Soft-Landing Fallacy and Consumer Debtors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 499, 500 (2002) (“At least if the credit market is competitive and transparent, any 
increase in ex post creditor collection translates to more favorable loan terms, such as a lower 
interest rate, for a debtor ex ante.”). Whether, in fact, the consumer credit market is truly com-
petitive and transparent is the subject to some disagreement. Compare Lawrence A. Ausubel, 
The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 70, 76 (1991) 
(arguing that in the case at least of credit cards, financial services institutions do not compete 
by offering lower rates), with Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Reform, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071, 1131–32 (2005) (suggesting that if debtors 
were permitted to waive the right to discharge by contract ex post the debtor would enjoy better 
terms ex ante). See infra note 313. 
299  This is part of the longstanding debate in the literature to identify an efficiency justification 
for security in general. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
209, 260 (1989). Although this article does not argue that security is necessarily efficient—
and, indeed, continues to question the wisdom of Article 9, see id. at 243–54—it does argue 
that allowing early lending financers to contract for priority can, in fact, be efficient. Id. at 
250. The efficiency debate is “efficiently” summarized in Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of 
Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, sec. VI.A, at 831–43 (2004). 
300  See supra note 297. This concern was discussed extensively by the Commission. See 
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 68, at 154 (“As the legislators recognized in the 
1970s, the economic effect of reaffirming a large amount of discharged debt can completely 
undermine the debtor’s financial rehabilitation. In fact, the debtor can be substantially worse 
off than if the debtor paid higher interest rates for postpetition credit.”); cf. Foohey et al., supra 
note 297, at 294 (concluding, based on empirical data, that people filing bankruptcy indicate 
overwhelmingly that they want to use bankruptcy as a tool to keep their automobiles). 
301  BAPCPA added a new subparagraph following 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9), but it does not bear 
a separate letter or number. Hence it has come to be termed the “hanging paragraph” or 
§ 1325(a)(*). Whatever the moniker, in substance the new provision provides that for purposes 
of § 1325(a)(5)—concerning the permissible treatment of secured claims in a chapter 13 
plan—“[§] 506(a) shall not apply” to a claim described in § 1325(a)(5) if the creditor has: (1) 
“a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt 
was incurred within the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the 
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle” (sometimes referred to as “910 day vehicle 
loans”); or (2) “if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was 
incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*). By taking 
§ 506(a) out of the equation, an undersecured lender’s claim is not bifurcated and, therefore, 
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advocates would point out that this not only makes it more costly to retain a 
vehicle, but also could make it impossible for an individual debtor to propose a 
confirmable plan at all in a case involving a 910 vehicle loan.302 Moreover, be-
cause chapter 13 is a zero-sum game, increasing the payout on secured claims 
necessarily will have an erosive impact on the amounts available for unsecured 
claimants.303 
It is true, as the pro-creditor position posits, that the availability of ride-
through, or the fourth option, makes it far less likely, although not inconceiva-
ble,304 that a debtor would ever choose or be counseled to redeem or reaffirm a 
debt. However, the argument would carry far more prowess if indeed creditors 
somehow had a right to redemption or reaffirmation. They do not.305 The former 
is an option that a debtor may elect when she deems it in her best interest to do 
so. The latter, reaffirmation pertains where both parties come to agreement on 
 
must be treated as fully secured for purposes of § 1322(b)(2). See generally Whitford, supra 
note 85, at 143 (predicting, accurately as it turned out, that automobile lenders are likely to 
benefit more than any other group under BAPCPA). 
302  A “910 vehicle loan” is the phrase used to describe a loan covered by the hanging para-
graph. Benjamin B. Coulter, No Surrender: Debtors, Creditors, and the Surrender of “910-
Vehicles” Under the “Hanging Paragraph” of the Bankruptcy Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 879, 886 (2010). Treating the entire claim as secured, 
rather than just to the extent of the value of the collateral, may cause the payments required 
over the life of the plan to exceed the debtor’s available income. In that case, the plan cannot 
be confirmed and the debtor will be relegated to chapter 7. 
303  One of the principal ways in which unsecured creditors are protected in chapter 13 is for 
all of the debtor’s income, over and above necessary expenses, including payments on account 
of secured debt, to be committed to payment of unsecured claims. Therefore, the greater the 
amount of monthly payments that must be made to secured claimholders in order to retain 
possession of the collateral, the less the surplus income that will be left for unsecured creditors. 
See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chap-
ter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 478–79 (2006) (“[T]he new provision limiting strip-down 
of certain purchase money security interests in Chapter 13 might be expected to further in-
crease the share of Chapter 13 disbursements paid to secured creditors and to correspondingly 
reduce payments to unsecured creditors.” (footnote omitted)); Ponoroff, supra note 122, at 
333 n.19. 
304  If, for instance, the obligation carries an above market interest rate and the debtor can re-
finance through a relative or other source, redemption would not be unexpected or irrational. 
The same would be true if the debtor had a prospective buyer for the goods willing to pay 
more than the redemption price. Neither scenario is likely to be common, the second even less 
than the first, but still such situations can and surely do arise. See Foohey et al., supra note 
297, at 315 (describing a “cottage industry” of lenders who actually focus on providing credit 
to debtors seeking to redeem collateral). 
305  Redemption under 11 U.S.C. § 722 is, by its terms, involuntary, in the sense that creditors 
can neither mandate redemption nor reject it if an offer to redeem is made. Reaffirmation under 
11 U.S.C. § 524(c) is voluntary in the sense that a creditor does not have to agree to reaffir-
mation, although the lender that does so in response to an offer to redeem on the original 
contract terms does to its peril if the debtor is current on payments. See supra note 94. At the 
same time, creditors cannot require reaffirmation if the debtor chooses, for instance, to surren-
der the collateral. Thus, the intimation that ride-through would somehow deprive secured cred-
itors of something to which there was an expectation or entitlement is to simply wave a flag 
that produces no breeze. 
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the terms on which the debtor’s personal liability will continue, and, of course, 
is subject to numerous controls to assure that it is truly voluntary and consonant 
with the debtor’s financial health. What creditors do have the right to in bank-
ruptcy is the value of their secured claims, measured by the value of the collat-
eral, and, in the case of undersecured claims, their pro rata share of any distribu-
tions made on account of unsecured claims. Ride-through does not in any way 
deprive secured lenders of these rights.306 Moreover, it is, of course, only open 
to what is likely a small percentage of debtors—those who have committed no 
act of default other than filing bankruptcy. 
Without ride-through redemption remains an option. However, as a practical 
matter it is generally acknowledged that if the debtor has the cash to purchase 
the collateral at its current value, in most cases she likely would not be in bank-
ruptcy in the first place.307 The potential loss of a vehicle necessary to earn a 
living, a home in which to provide shelter, or other critical property represents a 
serious impediment when viewed against the backdrop of the fresh start and 
debtor rehabilitation principles that are supposed to be the animating features in 
consumer bankruptcy cases. The debtor is thus left with the Hobson’s choice of 
reaffirm an undersecured debt or lose the property. The pro-debtor position 
would also emphasize that, typically, the value of the collateral at issue in these 
situations is modest,308 but the stakes for individual debtors and, in the aggregate, 
for society at large are quite high. 
In terms of the chapter 13 alternative, the pro-debtor polemic would surely 
draw attention to the inexplicable fact that, at the same time that Congress sought 
to force more debtors into chapter 13 through mechanisms like the means test,309 
 
306  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) bifurcates the claim of a partially secured creditor into a secured 
portion (measured by the value of the collateral) and an unsecured portion (consisting of the 
amount by which the claim exceeds the value of the collateral). 
307  BAPCPA put redemption even further out of reach of most debtors by adoption of a new 
§ 506(a)(2), which provides that personal property securing an allowed claim is to be deter-
mined based on replacement value without deduction for costs of sale and marketing. See su-
pra note 47. 
308  Foohey et al., supra note 297, at 294 (“[P]eople in bankruptcy own cars of modest value 
and owe immodest sums against those cars.”). In the case of personal property, often nonvehi-
cle secured loans are mere leverage liens, in the sense that the lender never seriously considers 
repossession and foreclosure because the game’s not worth the candle, but the threat of repos-
session might be enough to get a struggling debtor to prioritize the secured lender in fear of 
having personal possession repossessed. Real estate secured liens are a different story; hence 
ride-through is often permitted. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. Vehicle 
loans fall somewhere in-between, and it is the existence of this value that accounts for why 
reported ride-through cases invariably involve a vehicle-secured loan. However, in most cases 
the vehicle in question is likely to have a value of $20,000 or less. At this level, foreclosure is 
often not likely to produce much more than a breakeven outcome for the lender, who not un-
commonly will be the high bidder and then must turn around and re-sell. See Gail Hillebrand, 
The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Con-
sumers?, 75 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 69, sec. III.C.8.a, at 133–38 (1997) (discussing low values 
received on disposition sales of automobile collateral). 
309  11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
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which formed a central tenet of BAPCPA, Congress also made chapter 13 less 
attractive for debtors.310 This not only made it more difficult to confirm a plan, 
but in some cases well neigh impossible.311 The fact that lenders are amenable to 
reaffirmation provides little comfort, since these arrangements inevitably entail 
a negotiation in which the parties are hardly equally matched, to say the least. 
Moreover, while de facto ride-through may be quite common, it is not something 
that debtors can predictably rely upon, nor does it represent a means to avoid 
reaffirming a debt in excess of the value of the collateral. Finally, the assumption 
that lenders as a group would share the largesse they enjoy by elimination of 
ride-through with debtors generally in the form of a lower cost of credit ex ante 
is untested at best, and certainly no less established as a matter of fact than the 
assertion that permitting debtors to retain property without redemption or reaf-
firmation would drive up the cost of credit.312 The equally likely scenario is that 
creditors would simply arrogate whatever benefits might be associated with 
higher rates of collection through coerced reaffirmations.313 
 
310  See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers 
Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 191, 221 (2005) (“The fact that Chapter 13 is made much less attractive reveals 
much about the true agenda of the bill’s proponents, who proclaimed their desire for more 
debtors to file under that chapter. The real goal of the creditor lobby was to make bankruptcy 
of all types more difficult for debtors who need it. In fact, it seems quite likely that Chapter 
13 cases will go down, rather than up, as a percentage of bankruptcy filings.”); Ponoroff, supra 
note 294, at 16–17 (making the point that a debtor who cannot pass the means test for chapter 
7 and is ineligible for relief under chapter 13 because of debts in excess of the ceilings in 11 
U.S.C. § 109(e), would, for all intents and purposes, be left without access to bankruptcy relief 
of any sort given the restrictive rules BAPCPA adopted in relation to individual chapter 11 
cases). 
311  See supra notes 289 & 302. 
312  See supra note 297; see also In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386–87 (7th Cir. 1990) (re-
jecting ride-through under § 521(2) as originally enacted on the basis that allowing debtors to 
exercise the “fourth option” violates legislative policy by driving up the costs of credit and 
failing to protect creditors from the risks of quickly depreciating assets). In addition, the point 
about credit rates assumes that lower credit costs are an end to be pursued at almost any cost, 
ignoring the need to account for the countervailing consideration of debtor rehabilitation in 
needy cases. As such, it’s a self-defeating argument in much the same way as saying that 
insurance companies should deny meritorious claims inasmuch as a reduction in claims would 
reduce insurance premiums. 
313  See Hogan, supra note 85, at 911 (pointing up that due to a lack of sufficient bargaining 
power consumers are disadvantaged in setting ex ante terms, potentially allowing creditors to 
reap all of the rewards of enhanced collection). But see Zywicki, supra note 298, at 1132 
(arguing that the cost of the mandatory (nonwaivable) bankruptcy discharge provision in-
creases the rate of interest creditors must charge and “these costs will generally have their 
greatest impact on marginal borrowers—young lower-income, lower-wealth borrowers who 
are most likely to be turned down for credit as the cost and risk rises, who can least afford to 
pay higher credit costs, and who have the fewest number of credit options.”). 
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3. Analysis 
The policy-based arguments that have been mustered against the ride-
through over the years are not concocted or without some force. However, they 
are also not unexpected. Creditors want to reduce risk and want to be paid. That’s 
quite understandable. There was also something to secured creditors complaints 
prior to the 1984 Act that they were handicapped by not receiving prompt notice 
of the debtor’s intentions regarding collateral.314 Beyond that, however, it is 
again important to bear in mind that the bankruptcy system exists to allocate the 
costs of financial failure equitably and to restore individuals hopelessly in debt 
back to some measure of financial viability, even if consensus quickly breaks 
down when the question turns to just how much of a boost the honest but unfor-
tunate debtor is entitled to receive.315 In addition, it is important to stress that the 
creditor community is not a monolithic mob,316 and BAPCPA has already put a 
heavy thumb on the scale for secured creditors at the expense of their unsecured 
(and typically less sophisticated and politically powerful) compatriots.317 Not al-
lowing undersecured creditors to further inflate their secured claims by nullifying 
ride-through, often to the detriment of purely unsecured creditors, would seem a 
positive step in moving the needle in a more equitable direction. 
The claim that as long as the ride-through option is available a debtor will 
rarely, if ever,318 elect to redeem or reaffirm is spurious to begin with because, 
as noted earlier,319 these alternatives are not and were never intended to be op-
tions to which the secured creditor had an entitlement or cognizable right to in 
the first place. Moreover, the alarmist rhetoric ignores the fact that very few debt-
ors are able to take advantage of ride-through in any form because, by the time 
 
314  See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Ehrlich, supra note 107, at 640 (“[T]o 
the contrary [of some courts’ commentary on the issue], a logical sequence of testimony, bills, 
and floor statements combine to lead to the conclusion that the intent behind section 521(2)(A) 
was to provide some procedural mechanisms that would provide creditors with meaningful 
information about the debtor’s intentions, and reduce the costs to creditors of seeking relief 
from the stay when the debtor’s intentions were either to surrender the collateral or reaffirm 
the debt.”). 
315  As early as 1918, the Supreme Court discussed the fresh start for the unfortunate debtors 
as one of the two overriding polices of the bankruptcy system and of “great public interest.” 
See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); see also Loc. Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934) (describing the purpose of the bankruptcy law as giving the “honest but un-
fortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt”). 
316  See supra note 303. 
317  See supra note 122. 
318  In In re Edwards, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that because “[n]o debtor would reaffirm 
personal liability unless required to do so,” allowing a debtor to retain collateral without re-
demption or reaffirmation effectively negates “the voluntarism contemplated by the statute” 
and enables the debtor to force a new arrangement upon his secured creditors. 901 F.2d 1383, 
1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 1983), although In re 
Bell was addressing a different issue—that redemption cannot be accomplished through in-
stallment payments—a point over which there is no real disagreement). 
319  See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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they reach bankruptcy, most debtors are already behind in their payment obliga-
tions. Additionally, as a practical matter, in most secured consumer debt cases 
not involving real estate or automobiles, the net resale value of the collateral will 
be a fraction of the loan balance.320 Thus, the creditor is not only no worse off if 
the debtor chooses not to reaffirm but may actually wind up considerably better 
off since the full value of the lien survives and the sum of the continued payments 
may well exceed the redemption price.321 That scenario is certainly just as likely 
to occur, if not more likely, than the narrative that the debtor will allow the col-
lateral to depreciate rapidly and then default, leaving the lender with a net out-
come that is worse than if the lender had been permitted to foreclose immedi-
ately. Finally, the suggestion that chapter 13 is the proper alternative for a debtor 
who is current on payments implicitly assumes a success rate in individual debt 
adjustment cases that is belied by reality.322 
The point is that, in the vast number of consumer cases, the secured creditor 
never had a realistic expectation of recovering meaningful value from the collat-
eral upon default.323 Moreover, even in those relatively rare instances where 
preservation of the collateral is a legitimate concern, the creditor can protect it-
self with appropriate affirmative covenants in the security agreement relating to 
proper insurance, maintenance, and the like, with full rights to repossession and 
 
320  While there are exceptions, of course, by and large most security interests in consumer 
goods are taken more for their leverage value. See supra note 308. This is the rationale for the 
Federal Trade Commission rule making it a deceptive trade practice for a lender to take a 
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security in most forms of consumer goods. See 16 C.F.R. 
§ 444.2(a)(4) (2020); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 127 (1977), reprinted in 1977, 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 1977 WL 9628, at *2 (noting, in discussing changes made by the 1978 
Act to chapter 13, “[i]n consumer cases, very often a secured creditor with a security interest 
in all of the debtor’s property, including household and personal goods, uses the threat of 
foreclosure to obtain a reaffirmation of a debt. Otherwise, the secured creditor is able to de-
prive a debtor of even the most insignificant household effects . . . even though the items have 
little if any realizable market value. However, the goods do have a high replacement cost, and 
thus the creditor is able to use the threat of repossession, rarely carried out, to extract more 
than he would be able to if he did foreclose or repossess.” (footnote omitted)). 
321  This also explains the coincidence of why ride-through is, for the most part, invariably 
challenged in connection with vehicle loans. In most real estate cases, the lender will be pro-
tected by a more stable value or are indifferent because of mortgage insurance or anti-defi-
ciency legislation. See supra note 100. 
322  See Charles M. Foster & Stephen L. Poe, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal to Reform 
Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 104 DICK. L. REV. 579, 589 (2000) (noting 
only one-third of chapter 13 filers “were able to complete repayment plans, and many . . . were 
only able to make minimal repayments”); Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empir-
ical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 113 (2011) (suggesting that chapter 
13 is a “pretend solution” that “does not work as intended” and that has been a systemic failure 
for decades). 
323  While most of the reported decisions of course involve vehicles, in Mayton v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 B.R. 61, 63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) the collateral consisted of 
a sewing machine, a television and a “LXICU box/programmer” which the debtor had pur-
chased with her secured Sears credit card. See also In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1996) (a case in which Sears held a purchase money security agreement covering a 
variety of household goods ranging from televisions to mattresses). 
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foreclosure triggered in the event of nonobservance. Thus, creditor anguish over 
the debtor’s lack of incentive to maintain the collateral once personal liability 
has been discharged, even if well-founded to begin with,324 is the proverbial 
straw man that has very little place in an honest debate about the issue. 
Quite frankly, the end game for many creditors that seek to compel the 
debtor to choose among the three options listed in § 521(a)(2) is not knowledge 
of the debtor’s intentions, as originally maintained,325 but rather the effective re-
instatement of personal liability for the dischargeable portion of an undersecured 
creditor’s debt.326 While this ulterior motivation may be understandable, it is 
hardly the way the system is supposed to work. In short, a complete banishment 
of ride-through in chapter 7 gives secured creditors undeserved leverage over the 
individual debtor. The effect in many instances would be to defeat fresh start 
policy by either depriving the debtor of property necessary to return to produc-
tivity (which the debtor will rarely be in a position to replace) or leaving the 
debtor saddled with unmanageable debt. Elimination of ride-through also gives 
partially secured creditors an unearned advantage over other general creditors, 
both pre and postpetition, with respect to the unsecured portion of their debts in 
contravention with the strong equality norm that pervades in bankruptcy.327 
Accordingly, there is much to be said for permitting a nondefaulting debtor 
to ride a secured consumer loan through chapter 7 and pay it off postpetition 
without reaffirmation. The Commission offered the secured lending community 
half a loaf back in 1997, and it was shunned.328 Given the current uncertain state 
of affairs, that may have been a mistake in terms of their own best interest. It 
most assuredly was a mistake from the perspective of the overall effectiveness 
and integrity of the bankruptcy system, as the outcome in ride-through cases to-
day will depend upon a random mix of serendipitous factors that are devoid of 
any clear intentionality or coherence. 
It is also important to recall that the ride-through option will not be available 
in the overwhelming number of cases involving personal property secured 
loans.329 Ride-through has always been understood as limited to circumstances 
where the debtor is current on her payment obligations and not otherwise in 
 
324  See Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow, 197 B.R. 409, 412 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1996) (explaining why the debtor’s lack of personal liability on a secured debt does not nec-
essarily translate into a lack of incentive to take proper care of the collateral), aff’d, 126 F.3d 
43 (2d Cir. 1997). 
325  See supra note 43. 
326  See In re Mayton, 208 B.R. at 67 (noting, in a pre-BAPCPA case, that Sears’ real motiva-
tion in seeking an order compelling the debtor to amend her schedules was to obtain reaffir-
mation of the debt). 
327  See supra text accompanying note 303. 
328  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
329  Kate Davidson, Bankruptcy—Confusion and Ambiguity: The Post-BAPCPA Uncertainty 
Concerning the Ride-Through Option in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
489, 498, 502–03 (2014). 
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default other than by having filed bankruptcy.330 If there has been a prebank-
ruptcy default, and the debtor wishes to cure the arrearage or modify the loan, 
the debtor would still be required to propose a repayment plan under chapter 13, 
with all of the attendant requirements and creditor protections, including court 
supervision.331 On balance, then, the secured lender is, as a practical matter, in 
no worse position after bankruptcy than it was before, or at least not as a result 
of a nondefaulting debtor’s decision to elect the ride-through option. 
B. Proposals 
In addition to Professor Braucher’s early and prescient assessment of the 
impact of BAPCPA on ride-through,332 the literature contains two quite thought-
ful student Notes examining ride-through, one published in 2008 in the Columbia 
Law Review,333 and the other in 2013 in the Yale Law Journal.334 In the first Note, 
the author concludes that BAPCPA did not eliminate ride-through any more than 
it mandated ride-through.335 Therefore, the suggestion is that BAPCPA did not 
alter or affect the state of the law as it existed in 2005. In other words, the author 
submits that the 5-4 split of the circuits that existed pre-BAPCPA still prevails 
and will continue to do so until resolved by the Supreme Court.336 
The argument is a clever one, but, it suffers from some fundamental weak-
nesses, including the fact that it flies in the face of the decisional law that over-
whelmingly holds that, at least in the case of personal property, ride-through is 
not an option where the debtor fails to comply substantially with § 521(a)(2) and 
the loan documents contain an ipso facto clause.337 In fairness, the author’s sam-
ple size was relatively small given that the work was done in the early years 
following BAPCPA, but the point remains that the argument has not proved per-
suasive. Second, and more troubling, it relies in significant measure on the dubi-
ous assumption that congressional intent underlying BAPCPA was to rein in 
those upper and upper-middle class debtors who were abusing the bankruptcy 
 
330  Braucher, supra note 83, at 462 
331  See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. DeJournette, 222 B.R. 86, 96 (W.D. Va. 1998) 
(citing Beneficial N.Y., Inc. v. Bushey (In re Bushey), 204 B.R. 661, 663 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1997)) (holding that ride-through is not available for a debtor who is not current on a secured 
obligation). 
332  See Braucher, supra note 83, at 477–80. 
333  Hogan, supra note 85, at 882. 
334  Amber J. Moren, Note, Debtor’s Dilemma: The Economic Case for Ride-Through in the 
Bankruptcy Code, 122 YALE L.J. 1594 (2013). 
335  Hogan, supra note 85, at 924–25. This is also the position reached by the dissent in Dumont 
v. Ford Motor Credit Company (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (Graber, 
J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 140–144. 
336  Hogan, supra note 85, at 924. 
337  See supra Section IV.B. 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
Fall 2020] A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 265 
system, and, in doing so, actually to protect the lower and middle class filers.338 
While this may have been the rhetoric trumpeted at the time by some of the pro-
ponents of BAPCPA,339 it is (as the author acknowledges but refuses to concede 
in reviewing the possible criticisms of his view340) a bit naïve, and it is most 
certainly belied by the overall tenor the Act, which rather clearly was intended 
to tilt the scales against debtors of all stripes.341 Thus, the suggestion that these 
 
338  Hogan, supra note 85, at 926 (asserting that the primary goal of BAPCPA was to prevent 
high-income filer abuse and to protect rather than injure the lower and middle classes). But 
see Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY 
BANKR. DEVS. J. 407, 483 (2009) (commenting, in support of the proposition that BAPCPA is 
misnamed, that “[e]mpirical evidence has shown that the bankruptcy system was not being 
abused, and the measures within it do not protect consumers. The BAPCPA harms the poor 
both procedurally and substantively. . . . Unfortunately, the BAPCPA’s failure to balance the 
rights of both debtors and creditors equally prejudices those who need the fresh start the 
most—the poor.”); Dalié Jiménez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 642–43 
(2018) (noting that the empirical evidence in support of the proposition that bankruptcy stra-
tegic players manipulating the system at the expense of more worthy debtors was scant). 
339  See 151 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement of Rep. Todd Tiahrt) 
(“[T]he United States cannot afford to continue down the path where high consumer debt is 
routinely directed toward bankruptcy as a first stop rather than a last resort.”); 151 CONG. REC. 
S1854-56 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley); 149 CONG. REC. 
H1991, H1998 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Thomas Davis) (“Rather than an 
action of last resort, [bankruptcy] had evolved into a convenient vehicle to discharge debts 
through irresponsible financial practices.”); 147 CONG. REC. H517, H523 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2001) (statement of Rep. Frederick Boucher) (“Bankruptcy was never meant to be a financial 
planning tool, but it is increasingly becoming a first stop rather than a last resort . . . .”); 146 
CONG. REC. H9826, H9833 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Edward Bryant) (“In 
recent years, bankruptcy has truly become a first stop rather than a last resort.”); 144 CONG. 
REC. S10459, S10471 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Bankruptcy 
has become a routine financial planning device used to unload inconvenient debts, rather than 
a last resort for people who truly need it.”); see also Sousa, supra note 19, at 574 (noting that 
the credit industry cleverly framed the issue in the guise of high-income filers systematically 
abusing the system to the detriment of everyone else’s financial well-being). 
340  Hogan, supra note 85, at 921 (rejecting the arguments that BAPCPA was about the best 
result in bankruptcy for creditors or that the expressions of intent by legislative supporters 
were not reflective of their true intent). 
341  See Foohey et al., supra note 30, at 232 (“BAPCPA punishes everyone, [but] especially 
lower-income households, increasing the financial distress of people who file bankruptcy.” 
(emphasis added)); Jensen, supra note 30, at 498–99 (describing how a broad coalition of 
consumer creditors, who usually disagree on everything, represented by some of the most in-
fluential lobbyists in Washington D.C., came together in the effort to effect consumer bank-
ruptcy reform favorable to their interests); Sousa, supra note 19, at 574 (identifying bowing to 
the special interests of the credit industry as perhaps the only sensible rationale for the enact-
ment of BAPCPA). Empirical research done after this Note was published also suggests that 
the amendments created both structural and procedural barriers that may prevent some worthy 
individuals from filing. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 
20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 124–25 (2012); cf. Dickerson, supra note 39, at 1903 (as-
serting that the single industry capture explanation of BAPCPA provides an incomplete ex-
planation and that the broad support BAPCPA enjoyed from liberal and conservative legisla-
tors alike was as much the product of the desire not to alienate women, members of the armed 
forces, veterans, and seniors as it was the hope of receiving support from the financial services 
industry); see also supra notes 84–85. 
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court cases that regard BAPCPA as having eliminated ride-through for some 
chapter 7 filers “have subverted this goal of BAPCPA, hurting the same lower 
class individuals BAPCPA was supposed to protect,”342 is a tough pill to swal-
low. 
In the second Note, the author concedes that what she designates as “com-
mon law ride-through,” referring to the practice recognized in five circuit courts 
before 2005,343 was eliminated by BAPCPA.344 She contends, however, that it 
has been replaced by the more limited form of “backdoor ride-through,”345 allud-
ing to the willingness, as discussed earlier, of several post-BAPCPA courts to 
recognize ride-through where the debtor does enter into a reaffirmation agree-
ment with the lender, but that is disapproved by the bankruptcy court.346 After 
examining the inadequacy of the three § 521(a)(2)(A) options from an economic 
perspective,347 and considering the sufficiency and suitableness of alternative as-
set retention alternatives (including chapter 13) in light of the policy goals of 
chapter 7,348 the author concludes by advocating for the need for a third form of 
ride-through, which she denominates “statutory” ride-through.349 Essentially, the 
idea would be to codify ride-through as a sanctioned alternative for any debtor 
who is current on the secured obligation, as well as for debtors who are able to 
cure any prepetition defaults within a reasonable time.350 The author urges that 
this would promote uniformity and make ride-through available to a broader co-
hort of chapter 7 debtors, which is true,351 and provide better outcomes for both 
debtors and secured lenders, which is a sketchier assertion.352 
While impressed with both of these efforts,353 I am nonetheless forced to 
conclude that they each fall short of presenting a realistic and satisfactory solu-
tion. The first is predicated on a flawed assumption about the true intent of the 
proponents who championed the 2005 Act, and, ultimately, fails to propose any-
thing more than a return to the troublingly divided status quo ante. The second, 
while proffering an affirmative proposal, is inadequate to address all of the 
 
342  See Hogan, supra note 85, at 884. 
343  See supra text accompanying notes 49–60. 
344  Moren, supra note 334, at 1605–07. 
345  Id. at 1616–17. 
346  See text accompanying notes 70–71. 
347  Moren, supra note 334, at 1609–12 (describing redemption as usually infeasible and reaf-
firmation as uncertain and costly). 
348  Id. at 1617–25. 
349  Id. at 1625–27. 
350  Id. at 1626–27 (“[S]tatutory ride-through should be available to all debtors who are paid-
to-date at the time of bankruptcy proceedings, and also to those who are able to cure any 
default on payments ‘within a reasonable time’ of filing the Chapter 7 petition.”). The proposal 
also contemplates the deletion of § 362(h) from the Code and the portions of § 524 pertaining 
to reaffirmation, beginning with § 524(c), as no longer necessary. Id. at 1627. 
351  Id. at 1627–28. 
352  Id. at 1628–32. 
353  Indeed, I found them each helpful in thinking through my own ideas about ride-through. 
21 NEV. L.J. 209 
Fall 2020] A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 267 
shortcomings that inhere in the current state of the law,354 as well as problematic 
in its extension to noncurrent debtors through a cure right.355 That is to say, it 
gives unduly short shrift to the legitimate interests of lenders by expanding ride-
through to defaulted debtors. Therefore, I turn next to what I would maintain is 
a better option, although one that, as a practical matter, surely faces an uphill 
battle in the highly polarized political environment in which bankruptcy reform 
efforts have largely proceeded in the past.356 
C.  Alternative Proposal 
While the legislative history of the 1984 Act did not definitively answer the 
question of whether former § 521(2)(A) was intended to restrict the substantive 
options available to a debtor who wished to retain collateral,357 the circum-
stances, hearings, and testimony leading up to enactment of § 521(2), along with 
the language of the statute itself, all pointed to the general conclusion that 
§ 521(2) was meant to be a notice provision.358 In perhaps the most thoughtful 
analysis of the issue, Judge Small, in a decision ultimately affirmed by the Fourth 
Circuit, came to this conclusion based on detailed statements made at a congres-
sional subcommittee hearing by “a coalition of bankers, credit unions, finance 
companies, oil companies and retailers.”359 Those statements indicated that 
 
354  For instance, the proposal makes no distinction between situations where the underlying 
loan documentation does or does not contain an ipso facto provision, nor does it deal with the 
peculiarities that § 521(d), and courts’ interpretations thereof, have introduced into the law. 
See supra text accompanying notes 102–108. 
355  Moren, supra note 334, at 1627. This ability to cure and reinstate mimics the options avail-
able to a debtor in chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3). As noted earlier, ride-through with 
respect to current debts is already subject to criticism as undermining chapter 13. See supra 
text accompanying note 71. This proposal would only exacerbate the situation. 
356  See supra note 37. 
357  See In re Boodrow, 192 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A review of the legislative 
history does not assist [in] resolution of the matter . . . [N]either a Senate nor House report 
relating to Code § 521(2) became part of the record in connection with the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.”), aff’d sub nom., Cap. Commc’ns Fed. Credit Un-
ion v. Boodrow, 197 B.R. 409 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); aff’d, 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997). 
358  In re Boodrow, 197 B.R. at 412 (finding that the legislative history points to the general 
conclusion that § 521(2) was meant to be a notice provision only); Ehrlich, supra note 107, at 
637–40 (explaining, based on the legislative background of the statute, the procedural nature 
of § 521(2) as originally enacted in 1984); see also supra note 315. 
359  In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d sub nom., Home Owners 
Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 128 B.R. 142 (E.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d, 962 
F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992). 
The closest legislative statement interpreting § 521(2) is a statement made by Representative 
Rodino in response to a request by Representative Synar that he “explain what rights are reserved 
to the debtor and trustee under § 521(2)(C).” 130 Cong. Rec. H1810 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984). 
According to Chairman Rodino, the duty imposed under § 521(2) “does not affect the substantive 
provisions of the code which may grant the trustee or debtor rights with regard to such property.” 
Id. It appears from that statement that the debtor’s rights with respect to the property were to be 
left intact. 
Id. at 372. 
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former § 521(2)(A), as originally enacted in 1984, was intended specifically to 
respond to the complaint of secured creditors that they could not readily deter-
mine what a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy was going to do with collateral 
securing a debt.360 Instead, secured lenders pointed out that they were forced to 
spend time and money obtaining this information through judicial proceedings. 
Thus, the objective in advancing former § 521(2) was to place on the debtor “the 
responsibility of giving creditors information . . . as to what they intend to do 
with the collateral.”361 
This detailed review of the provenance of former § 521(2) made a strong 
case of course for the proposition that former § 521(2) was never intended to 
proscribe ride-through.362 That being so, if the intent of the 2005 Act was to take 
the next step and eliminate ride-through entirely, which is a fair assumption,363 
the black letter of BAPCPA (which must ultimately control) did a rather poor job 
of it, as has been seen. The result is even greater confusion, uncertainty, and 
discordance than existed before BAPCPA, and that’s saying something given the 
near fifty/fifty circuit split among the nine circuits to address the question.364 
As a compromise proposal that seeks to address legitimate concerns on both 
sides of the creditor/debtor divide, as well as more faithfully serve core bank-
ruptcy policy, I offer the following. First, leave § 521(a)(2) as is to respond to 
the concerns (noted above) that prompted the original adoption of § 521(2) in 
1984. Second, leave § 362(h) in place as well as a mechanism for creditors to 
have a prompt and transaction cost-free remedy in the event the debtor fails to 
comply with her § 521(a)(2) duties in the case of personal property collateral. 
This of course would represent an enhancement of the rights of secured creditors 
beyond what had been afforded by the 1984 Act. 
Next, repeal § 521(a)(6), and by so doing eliminate not only its internal con-
fusion regarding holders of allowed claims,365 but its perplexing relationship with 
§ 521(a)(2) as well. Purchase-money lenders would not be prejudiced since they 
would have the same protection under §§ 521(a)(2) and 362(h). Finally, repeal 
§ 521(d) and amend § 524(a)(2) by adding at the end of the provision  
including any action against property of the debtor securing a prepetition debt as 
to which the debtor was, at the time of entry of discharge, and thereafter remains, 
not in default other than by reason of a provision in an agreement, transfer 
 
360  Id. at 370 n.5. 
361  Id. at 371 n.5. 
362  See Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 B.R. 61, 67–68 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1997) (noting that “the only logical basis for reconciling the conflicting elements of [former] 
§ 521(2),” specifically the prescriptions of subdivisions (A) and (C), was “to hold that it is 
essentially a notice statute”); In re Bracamortes, 166 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1994) 
(holding that an “N/A” designation effectively told the secured creditor all that it needs and 
was entitled to know with respect to the debtor’s intentions). 
363  See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
364  See supra Part II. 
365  See supra note 95. 
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instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law that defines an event of default in 
relation to the debtor’s financial condition or the commencement of a case under 
this title. 
These last two steps obviously operate to authorize ride-through both during 
and after the bankruptcy case and take ipso facto clauses off the table in the same 
manner as the court did in In re Nuckoles,366 except now with a proper statutory 
basis.367 The abolition on the enforceability of ipso facto clauses in ride-through 
cases across the board would eliminate having the issue turn on the serendipity 
of circuit precedent and/or underlying state law. This would ensure equity inter 
se among debtors, regardless of where they happened to reside, and would ad-
vance the bankruptcy fresh start goal uniformly across the nation.368 It would also 
endorse ride-through with respect to real-estate secured loans, with the added 
protection that the stay could not be lifted except upon a proper showing under 
§ 362(d). Finally, given the widespread consolidation in the banking and finan-
cial services industry that has occurred over the past few decades, it would also 
synchronize credit practices in a fashion that would promote greater consistency 
and efficiency for many lenders, even if, all things being equal, they might have 
preferred a different substantive outcome. 
In a practical sense, abrogating § 521(d) would not really change much since 
it is an odd provision, out of step with bankruptcy policy generally,369 and really 
does nothing in and of itself even when it does apply.370 The real change brought 
about by this proposal would be the amendment to make clear that exercise of a 
creditor’s state law remedies based on violation of an ipso facto clause in a ride-
through situation is prohibited by the discharge injunction. Again, however, 
while concededly debtor-friendly, it is really not that much of a boon for debtors 
nor a blow for creditors as might be perceived at first glance. First, as noted ear-
lier, many states already limit the enforceability of ipso facto clauses.371 Second, 
its application would be limited to cases where there was no other event of de-
fault, which is to say cases where there is no clear and present threat to the 
lender’s prospect of being paid or to its collateral. Indeed, lenders should take 
some comfort in the fact that if the debtor managed somehow to keep current 
with payments and other loan obligations before bankruptcy, the debtor should 
be a pretty good bet now that most of her other obligations have been discharged. 
Finally, the uncommon frequency of consensual or de facto ride-through, as 
first identified by Professors Culhane and White in their classic empirical study 
 
366  Nuckoles v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Nuckoles), 546 B.R. 651 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2016). 
367  This was the element missing in In re Nuckoles. See id. at 654; supra notes 194–210 and 
accompanying text. 
368  See infra Part VI. 
369  See supra notes 104–05. 
370  E.g., Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that § 521(d) does not confer any substantive right on creditors to take action 
against collateral). 
371  See supra note 234. 
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of reaffirmations,372 is evidence that, in reality, secured creditors are not unduly 
prejudiced by loss of the debtor’s personal liability through discharge.373 If they 
were, it is highly unlikely that, as rational economic actors, they would acquiesce 
in the debtor’s continued possession of the collateral. A more contemporary 
study undertaken by Professors Foohey, Lawless, and Thorne has confirmed that 
debtors continue to use bankruptcy in overwhelming numbers in order to retain 
their most valuable car.374 In their sample, only about 1.3% of debtors stated an 
intention to redeem, while 11.7% indicated they would surrender their vehicle.375 
This compared with 58.8% who stated they planned to reaffirm.376 Despite the 
changes made to §§ 521and 362 by BAPCPA, seeking to mandate selection of 
one of the three options,377 the authors discovered that nearly twenty percent of 
debtors make either no statement of intention or indicated an intent to retain with 
no explanation how they would do so. Coupled with the fact that BAPCPA has 
made reaffirmation more difficult,378 the authors speculate that this high number 
may signal that a combination of what they term “rogue reaffirmations” and con-
sensual ride-through persists.379 
The reality is that the expenses associated with repossession and foreclosure, 
coupled with the notoriously low values received at distress sales, make exercise 
of the creditor’s state law remedies unappealing in most cases. Thus, it is not 
surprising that, in practice, creditors often conclude that they are likely to be 
better off in the long-run by acquiescing in the ride-through, including keeping 
 
372  See generally Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Em-
pirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999). 
373  Id. at 740–41 (determining that many of the debtors in their study retained their cars after 
bankruptcy without reaffirming or redeeming); see Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer 
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 528 (1993) (noting creditors 
in non-ride through jurisdictions would often accept payments even though they could have 
repossessed collateral); Whitford, supra note 85, at 154 (using the terms “voluntary ride-
through” and “creditor acquiescence”); Karen Gross, Perceptions and Misperceptions of Re-
affirmation Agreements, 102 COM. L.J. 339, 347–48 (1997) (using the term “informal reaffir-
mations”). In a voluntary ride-through, the secured creditor declines to exercise its legal rem-
edies, allowing the debtor to retain the property provided the debtor continues making 
payments. See In re Jensen, 407 B.R. 378, 389–90 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that noth-
ing in BAPCPA prevents debtors and secured creditors from engaging in “voluntary ride-
through”). Nonetheless, Culhane and White also found a very high correlation between reaf-
firmations and jurisdictions where ride-through was not recognized. See Culhane & White, 
supra note 372, at 727. 
374  See Foohey et al., supra note 297, at 294. 
375  Id. at 318, 321 tbl.5. 
376  Id. 
377  See supra text accompanying notes 86–108. 
378  See supra text accompanying note 109; see also Foohey et al., supra note 297, at 314 
(attributing the post-BAPCPA decline in reaffirmations to the new procedures engrafted on 
the process by the 2005 Act). 
379  Foohey et al., supra note 297, at 326 (opining that, if true, these phenomena would run 
counter to the goals of BAPCPA and might potentially be harmful to debtors as well). The 
authors suggest the testing of this hypothesis as a fruitful area for further study. Id. 
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alive the possibility of full payment with contract interest.380 This is certainly true 
with respect to residential mortgage loans, given that many states already protect 
homes with antideficiency legislation.381 The effect of these proposed changes 
therefore would, in the aggregate, codify Seiffert in all instances where there is 
no default save for the debtor having availed herself of bankruptcy relief, regard-
less of whether the loan documents contain an ipso facto clause. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIDE-THROUGH PROPOSAL FOR THE CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
Achieving consensus on the foundational goals of the consumer bankruptcy 
regime is a task doomed to failure, as it is an ecosystem composed of participants 
with fundamentally different interests who, perhaps most fatal to the effort, have 
a dog in the hunt. Moreover, scholarship aimed at attempting to explain or justify 
the consumer bankruptcy system, while robust,382 has also failed to produce an 
overarching theory of widespread acceptance.383 
I would submit that the difficulty in finding the normative center of con-
sumer bankruptcy is what led the board of directors of the American Bankruptcy 
Institute, in its resolution creating a new Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, 
to charge the Commission 
with recommending improvements to the consumer bankruptcy system that can 
be implemented within its existing structure. These changes might include amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, changes to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure, administrative rules or actions, recommendations on proper interpreta-
tions of existing law, and other best practices that judges, trustees, and lawyers 
can implement.384 
The exploratory committee, which recommended the formation of the Com-
mission, “determined that the project should be limited to a consideration of 
 
380  See Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 117, 119 (1983) (“Repossession ‘destroys value’ because individual debtors commonly 
value goods in excess of their market prices but repossessing creditors at best resell at these 
prices. Because repossession imposes greater harms on debtors than it creates gains for credi-
tors, it actually minimizes welfare.”). 
381  See Culhane & White, supra note 372, at 746–47 (explaining reasons creditors permit ride-
through, including anti-deficiency statutes, private mortgage insurance, government guarantee 
programs, real estate values increasing over time, and sale of residential mortgages on second-
ary market); see also supra note 267. 
382  See supra note 19. 
383  See Sousa, supra note 19, at 560 (claiming that in one way or another all of the previous 
theories advanced for explaining the bankruptcy discharge fall short in that they prove to be 
too restrictive to account for, and rectify, all of the issues facing the individual debtor). Sousa 
then offers a utilitarian-derived theory to justify the discharge with the overall “good” to be 
maximized being the promotion of the debtor’s holistic well-being, and by extension, that of 
all other debtors who file for bankruptcy protection each year. Id. at 591–602. 
384  AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY, 
at VIII (2019). 
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discrete issues arising in consumer bankruptcy cases.”385 In other words, nobody 
wanted to go down the rabbit hole of addressing the underlying nature of and 
purpose for the system ab initio. 
This was a wise choice, as the effort would otherwise have bogged down in 
the impenetrable thicket of identifying the macroeconomic effects of debt relief 
and ascertaining how to maximize societal welfare, assuming consensus could 
be achieved that this should even be the purpose of the exercise in the first place. 
The tension between humanitarian impulses and economic utility in setting the 
needle on the distributional objectives of consumer bankruptcy are dreadfully 
hard questions and, ultimately, ones that only have answers in the political arena. 
This does not, however, prevent one from having a view about why we need a 
consumer bankruptcy system and what its goals ought to be. 
Whether one regards it as social progress or pathology, the reality is that we 
live in a day and age of consumer credit that could not have been imagined even 
fifty years ago.386 It is beyond contention that the use of consumer credit has 
become an integral part of American culture.387 Over two decades ago, Professor 
Warren commented that: “Americans need a safety valve to deal with the finan-
cial consequences of the misfortunes they may encounter. They need a way to 
declare a halt to creditor collection actions when they have no reasonable possi-
bility of repaying. They need the chance to remain productive members of soci-
ety, not driven underground or into joblessness by unpayable debt.”388 Most of 
the debate over redistributive goals in bankruptcy has taken place in the context 
of business reorganizations where the tension has been between scholars who 
view bankruptcy as embodying substantive social goals389 and those (dubbed 
“proceduralists”) who eschew the suggestion that bankruptcy ought to serve a 
purpose other than maximizing returns overall for those holding cognizable legal 
 
385  Id. at VII. 
386  See Lendol Calder, The Meaning of Consumer Credit in the United States, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2001, at 52 (dating the advent of the modern system of credit for consumers 
somewhere 1915 and 1935); see also Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? 
An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (“Continuing 
a trend begun in the early 1980s, the families in bankruptcy are much more deeply laden with 
debt. Their net worth, which has always been negative, sank further, and their debt-to-income 
ratios rose higher.”). See generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999). 
387  Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 603 (2009) (“Without a doubt, credit has become an essential part of 
the consumer economy and is relied upon by many as both a convenience and a necessity.”). 
388  Warren, supra note 30, at 492; see also Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? 
Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 426 (2012) 
(examining the distributive consequences and social insurance function of “tax non-collec-
tion”). 
389  The traditionalist view is most commonly associated with the work of Elizabeth Warren 
and her frequent collaborator Jay Westbrook. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 35, at 789–93; see 
also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 717, 722–25 (1991). 
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claims against the debtor.390 Nevertheless, the same tension pervades the con-
sumer bankruptcy system, although the wealth transfer at issue is a bit simpler 
since it flows from creditors to debtors, and sometimes among creditors.391 Ulti-
mately, consumer bankruptcy represents a balancing act between a necessary so-
cial insurance function392 and the strict enforcement of private contractual 
rights.393 
While the search for an all-encompassing normative theory of bankruptcy is 
probably an idle and futile exercise, I still believe that relief from burdensome 
debt and the opportunity to return to economic viability are important societal 
goals that must be supported, even if, at times, at a cost to individual creditors. 
Exactly how far we should go in underwriting this debtor rehabilitation is a 
 
390  See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576–80 
(1998) (describing traditionalists as sharing a conviction that bankruptcy plays a special role 
in the legal system and proceduralists of the belief that a coherent bankruptcy law must rec-
ognize how it fits into the rest of the legal system and supports a vibrant market economy). 
No doubt, Thomas Jackson’s path-breaking article, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Enti-
tlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, [91 YALE L.J. 857, 857–59 (1982),] marks the 
inception of the proceduralist academic school. The creditors’ bargain theory, as further 
developed by both Jackson and Baird, featured a pseudo-Rawlsian contractarian core 
based on the idea that bankruptcy law generally reflects the hypothetical creditors’ bar-
gain that creditors would reach if they were to bargain before their extensions of credit. 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil 
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 948 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
391  See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest 
Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943, 
1946–49 (2011) (describing BAPCPA as following the “well-worn” path of resistance to the 
redistributive element inherent in any welfare program). A key tenet of the proceduralist view 
is for nonbankruptcy entitlements (the state law bargain) not to be affected in bankruptcy, 
except as necessary to solve the collective action problem facing creditors under the first-in-
time state law collection system. See Baird, supra note 390, at 582, 588. Thus, extension of 
the proceduralist approach in the consumer context would translate into a rejection of ride-
through as ignoring its ex ante effects insofar as the cost of credit is concerned and intolerably 
altering the secured creditor’s state law rights by allowing the debtor to retain the collateral 
without also accepting personal liability. “Balancing” may be the wrong term, as it implies 
that there is some point along the spectrum, perchance equidistant from the two antipodal ends, 
where the fulcrum can be placed to ensure perfect equipoise, as in a feat of mechanical engi-
neering. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21. 
392  Compare Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: 
Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2001) (“In this Article, 
[the authors] consider the extent to which middle-class families have used bankruptcy as a 
safety net, or as insurance of last resort, in the financial aftermath of medical problems.”), with 
Zywicki, supra note 298, at 1073–74 (2005) (offering an apologia for BAPCPA based on the 
dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcy filings, which the author attributes to: (1) an in-
crease in benefits from filing at lower costs, (2) a change in social norms reducing the stigma 
associated with filing, and (3) changes in the nature of consumer credit that have rendered 
consumer credit increasingly impersonal). 
393  See supra note 303. 
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sociopolitical question over which policy makers will surely quibble.394 There is 
no isonomy or point of perfect equipoise as one might reasonably expect to find 
in the physical world. The question entails assessment of fluid societal norms 
and mores, and, as such, differs from a feat of mechanical engineering or an 
analysis of fixed chemical properties. However, wherever the normative fulcrum 
is set, it only makes sense that an indispensable component of this effort to reha-
bilitate is the right to retain the tools that are essential to the ability to make the 
most of the bankruptcy fresh start; otherwise, the fresh start is an empty vessel. 
Houses and cars fall squarely in that category in most cases, as usually do 
tools of the trade. Exemptions play this role vis-a-vis unsecured creditors,395 but 
as the exemptions are subordinate to liens, and because perceived due process 
considerations constrain the ability to deprive secured creditors of their property 
interests,396 additional techniques are needed. I believe ride-through for a limited 
class of debtors is one of those mechanisms. It may not alone be enough, but it 
is not too much, limited, as has been proposed, to those cases where the debtor 
has proved, through course of performance under the loan, that she is a good bet. 
For all the reasons noted above, the real redistributive impact is minor in the 
aggregate,397 but vital to the debtor in individual cases, and to avoiding the crea-
tion of a hopelessly alienated debtor class. 
 
394  Where the line should be drawn between the dual purposes of chapter 7 at any point in 
time will depend on larger moral and social value judgments, where unanimity of opinion will 
never be achieved and that, like public policy, will tend to wax and wane over time. The situ-
ation is complicated by the fact that the goal of most of those involved in bankruptcy reform 
is not to craft the optimal system, but rather to push for rules that favor their interests at the 
expense of others. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political 
and Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 801–02, 839–41, 856–59 (1997) (proposing a model for explaining bank-
ruptcy legislation based on a combination of game theory and public choice theory, and 
demonstrating the effect that interest groups have in directing bankruptcy reform legislation 
away from the intended objects of the system). 
395  See, e.g., William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption 
Limitations: The “Opt-Out” as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 149, 163–70 (1997) (examining the purposes served by exemptions in general, and in 
bankruptcy in particular, and relating those purposes to the bankruptcy fresh start concept for 
the individual debtor); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert 
Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 235, 241 (1995) (identifying the discharge and exemptions as the two core constituents 
of the fresh start policy). 
396  See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982) (“The bankruptcy power is 
subject to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against taking private property without compen-
sation.” (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)). But see 
Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited Rights of Se-
cured Creditors, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 765, 766 (rejecting the argument that the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause necessarily entitles secured creditors to the full value of their collateral 
in bankruptcy cases, and concluding that the Bankruptcy Clause is the only limitation on Con-
gress’s power to modify the claims of secured creditors). 
397  In point of fact, there is only a negative distributive impact for secured creditors if the 
debtor, freed from personal liability on the obligation, fails to maintain the collateral, 
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Admittedly, consumers are not entirely without fault in the amassing unman-
ageable debt obligations.398 Likewise, there is a moral hazard associated with any 
form of social insurance399 but the conceptualization of the fresh start for the 
honest but unfortunate debtor as an essential component of the commercial re-
gime is no longer open to question.400 So, it just becomes a matter of degree. 
Moreover, debt is necessary to sustain our contemporary markets for consumer 
goods and services.401 Taking account of the importance of consumer spending 
to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product and, thus, to the overall health of the econ-
omy,402 giving debtors a fighting chance to return to financial well-being by re-
taining critical property is a small price to pay, even though we know without 
question that not all debtors are worthy or will use the opportunity wisely or as 
intended. While perhaps suffering a greater loss on any particular credit, collec-
tively and over time, the credit industry itself is better off operating in a system 
that both recognizes the fresh start and implements it in as near to an optimal 
fashion as is possible in an imperfect world. 
 
ultimately resulting in a net lower recovery by the lender than would have been the case in the 
event of an immediate foreclosure. However, as the majority noted in Capital Communications 
Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 1997), a debtor 
discharged in bankruptcy has an even greater incentive to maintain the collateral because of 
the difficulty in obtaining credit to replace the property and in order to protect the debtor’s 
own equity in the property. See also Ehrlich, supra note 107, at 665–66 (observing that per-
sonal liability has little impact on the debtor’s incentive or disincentive to take proper care of 
the collateral); supra note 324. 
398  See Lupica, supra note 387, at 575 (“[C]onsumers have voluntarily adopted and realized 
the illusion of a middle class identity in their willingness to acquire ‘stuff’ at any cost.”). 
399  It has been argued that broad access to the chapter 7 discharge causes debtors to borrow 
more heavily and accept riskier investments than they might otherwise make since the conse-
quences of default will be less severe. F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy 
Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 195–96 (1998) (criticizing the work of TERESA A. SULLIVAN 
ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 133 (1989), for overlooking moral hazard concerns and 
their ex ante effects); Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 142, 167 (2005) (noting that the ready availa-
bility of a discharge in bankruptcy reduces incentives to curtail consumption in advance of 
financial distress or the incentives to exercise discipline in the aftermath of the losses incurred 
as a result of such distress). Feibelman goes on later to identify ways in which chapter 7 coun-
teracts the potential harm caused by moral hazard. Id. at 166–70. 
400  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
401  See Lupica, supra note 387, at 601–02 (highlighting that debt became necessary to sustain 
the very existence of the markets for consumer goods and services, such that the continued 
existence of such markets required that incentives be offered to increase the level of consumer 
debt). 
402  John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before America’s Community 
Bankers 7 (Nov. 5, 2002), https://ots.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech-2002-
86.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN4N-3ETJ] (“[C]onsumer spending—and borrowing—is crucial to 
the health of the banking system and the economy, present and future.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this treatment I have attempted to demonstrate that BAPCPA made the 
wrong decision about ride-through and then couldn’t even get that right. If there 
was not already enough evidence of this, Seiffert has shown what a hash Con-
gress has made of it. The resulting chaos, which can only get worse as courts 
encounter new fact situations, hardly promotes the integrity of the system or 
serves the interests of the participants in the bankruptcy process collectively, 
even if there may be discrete winners and losers in individual cases. 
The solution I have proposed provides secured lenders with a quick and pain-
less way to exercise their rights against collateral when a debtor fails to substan-
tially comply with § 521(a)(2) and has already committed a material default. 
However, when the only default is the very act of filing bankruptcy, I have also 
proposed certain legislative changes that effectively give debtors the fourth op-
tion of retaining their property so long as they continue making payments and 
observe the other covenants contained in the loan documentation. Given the gen-
eral disfavor in which ipso facto clauses are held, both in and outside of bank-
ruptcy, and their relative unimportance in actually producing greater creditor re-
turns, this seems a fair compromise to strike and one that holds the best hope for 
producing predictable results and rational consequences. 
